Why is Allahabad so neglected

The role of fellahin in the "Egyptian Revolution" 1919

1 Introduction

Investigating peasant protests and movements poses a number of particular problems. Although rural rebellions were a common occurrence in the “Middle East” and North Africa in the 19th and 20th centuries, they were comparatively seldom the subject of scientific research.

This also applies to Egypt. Only a few historians and social scientists deal explicitly with the backgrounds, motives and the various forms of expression of peasant protest in the 19th and 20th centuries in general or with the role of the Fallahin in the Egyptian "revolution" of 1919.1

The number of studies dealing with the development of the national movement, which is mainly supported by the urban educated elite, and its various parties and groups is far greater.2

When looking at the events of 1919 in Egypt, many of these authors not only ignore the revolts in the country, but also the role of the various groups in the cities (such as the trade unions and the inhabitants of the poor areas) or use the catchphrase a "National Revolution" summarized, as in the works of Quraishi, Terry and Zayid. The otherwise very detailed work of ar-Rafi i also ignores many contradictions that could call the image of a “national revolution” into question.3 Even Ruskay, who examines the process of political mobilization in 1919, and in particular the role of non-formally organized groups (“voluntary groups”), confines himself to urban groups.4

On the other hand there is a large number of scientific studies on rural Egypt of the 19th century, in which questions about the forms of land ownership, the production methods in the country, the colonial penetration and the relationships between the rural and the urban Society to be studied. The Egyptian Fallahin are often portrayed as “victims” of these processes, which have been extensively investigated, but they are not allowed to play an independent role or act independently or are even ignored. Their participation in the “revolution” of 1919 is mostly, if it is mentioned at all, reduced to the role of a “foot people” who can be mobilized at any time and which, under the leadership of their notables and the Cairo Wafd, is responsible for the “national cause”. Egypt fought.

Contemporary British observers, on the other hand, emphasize the backwardness and subservience of the Egyptian Fallahin: "The bulk of the people are a primitive peasantry ..." "... A population so easy going and so submissive, (...), they are much too backward to have any opinion one way or the other. "5 The aim and task of British politics is to improve their situation and to free them from their backwardness.6 The different forms of resistance in the Fallahin as well as individual responses to the social situation are mainly described with categories such as “banditry” and denounced as “criminal”.

A general problem with the investigation of peasant protests and movements is the small number of authentic sources that can provide information about the motivation and purpose of these movements. Schulze's information is also often based on (unpublished) archive material from the British Foreign Office, the War Office, and reports from Egyptian daily newspapers at the time.

Written legacies from farmers themselves are very rare, so that the motivation of those involved can often only be concluded on the basis of deeds.

However, the source problem will be dealt with in more detail in the second section, where the question of what motivated the resistance of the Fallahin was motivated and what it was directed against, and last but not least, what is defined or perceived as resistance in the literature at all. The focus should be on the events of the 19th century and include the first years of the 20th century up to the beginning of the First World War. The role of the Fallahin during the Egyptian “revolution” of 1919 is dealt with in the third section become. Due to the limited scope of the work, the genesis of the Egyptian national movement, its origins and its different parties and groupings, as well as its political ideas can only be dealt with to the extent that it is directly necessary for a general understanding of the political situation in 1919. First, however, the general characteristics, the colonial penetration and the structural change of the Egyptian rural society are to be dealt with, whereby questions of property and power relations as well as forms of production in the country are at the center of the considerations. This is where the main causes for the emergence of new strata or classes and for the disputes between the agrarian and the developing urban colonial society, which are also expressed in the revolts of the Fallahin of March and April 1919, among other things.

2 The colonial penetration and transformation of Egyptian rural society in the 19th century

Up until a few years ago there was a broad consensus that the process of colonization, understood by Schulze as "... planned restructuring of regional economies with the aim of integrating them into a superordinate system based on a hierarchical division of labor and centralized on the basis of capital production .." . "7, began in Egypt at the beginning of the 19th century with the reign of Muhammad Ali.

The predominant forms of production in Egyptian agricultural society, which were replaced as a result of this development, are described as the form of moral economy, characterized by the absence of market-mediating structures based on norms generally recognized in the community and a network of mutual obligations. Some authors also speak of an "Islamic moral economy".8 However, the attempt to reduce the characteristics of the production and reproduction of social life characteristic of Egyptian agricultural society to a generally applicable model is hardly possible. General prevailing elements were, for example, the classification of the villages according to their membership of families or tribes within which there was community of property, the absence of state institutions and their representatives and the predominance of subsistence farming, the collective responsibility of the village as a taxable unit, and the existence of communal land (musa) that was periodically redistributed for use.9 The majority of the villages in the 18th and 19th centuries can therefore be described as relatively self-sufficient units.10

The most important factors for the colonization of Egyptian agricultural society and the accompanying changes in Egyptian social structure in the 19th century are changes in the rights of use and disposal of the land and the introduction of cotton cultivation in the 1920s.

Under the rule of Muhammad Ali, the privatization of the land, which had previously been nominally owned by the state, began and the old system of tax lease (Iltizam) was replaced in favor of direct taxation of land, enforced by paid employees of the state.11

In place of the class of the multazims, in a complicated process, the course of which cannot be described in detail here, a multitude of new social groups emerged, differentiated by different ownership of real estate. The actual privatization of land, ie a legal safeguarding of free rights of use and disposal, such as the right to inherit, lease or sell land, did not begin until the 1940s under the Khedive Said . Said also tried to regulate the question of the unlawful acquisition of land for foreigners in the Ottoman Empire, which was associated with uncertainties in Egypt. However, this was not legally regulated until the “Mixed Courts” were set up in 1876.12 Investment by foreigners in land ownership was, however, small compared to other branches of the economy, such as export business, which was almost exclusively dominated by foreign capital. For example, in 1897 the proportion of land that was in the hands of foreign landowners was only about 10% of the country's agricultural area. In the course of the process of replacing the Iltizam with private property, the village's collective responsibility for the tax revenue was lifted in favor of individual taxation of the individual parcels.13

Muhammad Ali's policy also initiated the first phase of agricultural expansion and the integration of Egypt into the world market through the systematic cultivation of cotton, which began in the 1920s with the help of foreign specialists. Even if the original interest in cotton growing was primarily self-sufficiency (the army), the export share of raw cotton between 1821 and 1846 already reached an average of 28% annually.14 The original monopoly of the cotton trade by the Egyptian state came to an end when, in the early 1940s, under pressure from the European powers, the country was forced to adopt the Treaty of Balta Liman between Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire in 1838 included the abolition of all monopolies and the opening of markets.15

It was above all the "cotton famine" on the world market that arose as a result of the American War of Secession, which resulted in the surge in the export of cotton and an expansion of the cultivated areas. The export share of cotton reached a record 91.5% in 1865 and, despite its decline after the end of the American Civil War in 1882, was still 65%. Great Britain was able to secure the bulk of the cotton exports, which in return rose to become the most important country of origin of Egyptian imports.16 With the end of the civil war, the need for Great Britain to control Egyptian cotton exports grew as the price of American raw cotton soared due to the abolition of slavery.17 In the course of the colonization of Egypt, especially as a result of the “Cotton Boom” from 1861 to 1864, the number of foreigners (Levantines, Greeks and other Europeans) living in the country rose sharply. While 3,000 foreigners were still living in the whole country in 1836, there were already 68,000 in 1878 and around 90,000 in 1891, of whom almost 80,000 lived in the metropolises of Cairo and Alexandria.18

The introduction of cotton cultivation in the 20s of the 19th century resulted in the development of several different structural areas, each with a specific historical relationship to the degree of colonial penetration. The provinces of the Nile Delta Sarqiya, Da-qahliya, Garbiya and Manufiya, where the first attempts at cultivation were made in the early 1920s, were hit first and most sustainably by the restructuring of agriculture and cotton cultivation, a process that began in the 1890s Century was largely completed. In the 1820s, more than 90% of all Egyptian cotton was grown in these provinces. In this region, the investments of the large foreign agricultural companies and banks had their focus and were many times higher than in Upper Egypt. By means of extensive dyke work, large areas in the northern delta, which had previously been salty by lake water, could be reclaimed for cotton cultivation.

In contrast to the delta region, the provinces of Central and Upper Egypt were systematically developed for cotton cultivation only after the country was occupied by the British in the 1980s and especially in the 1990s.19

The process, outlined here only in its basic features, resulted in changes that affected all social relations of production and reproduction, such as: E.g. work organization, forms of property ownership, etc. The cultivation of cotton first of all required an expansion and modification of the irrigation system. The traditional cultivation methods only allowed two cultivation phases, one in autumn during the Nile floods, the other in winter by irrigation of the basin. In contrast, as a summer plant with a growing season of around six months, cotton requires permanent artificial irrigation, especially in the dry period from April to August.

Therefore, by 1833 canals with a total length of about 240 miles had been dug and widened.20 After the occupation by the British, the construction of dams and irrigation canals, which until then had been concentrated on the provinces of the Delta, was continued in order to gain areas in Central and Upper Egypt for cotton cultivation. A comparison of the sums invested annually shows that the decisive phase of agricultural expansion fell between the years 1897 and 1907.21

The proportion of permanently irrigated areas, which were mainly used for cotton cultivation, in relation to the total cultivable area of ​​the individual provinces shows the temporal course of colonial penetration. In 1897 this proportion was almost 100% in the Delta Provinces and Fayyum, while it was much lower in the Upper Egyptian provinces (3% in Giza, 8% in Asyut, 41% in Minya, 15% in Girga and in Qina and Aswan 0%).22

The burden of expanding the irrigation system, which was the basis for cotton cultivation, had to be borne primarily by the Fallahin, whose labor was cheap and available at all times thanks to the Corvee's system. The so-called Corvee, which had existed for centuries, had regularly obliged the male rural population to work to improve the infrastructure and was the basis for maintaining the existing irrigation systems. Until the end of the 18th century, these works were carried out in the immediate vicinity of the villages, so that the results of the work also benefited the residents of the village to a certain extent. Under Muhammad Ali, work began on expanding the Corvee and recruiting the Fallahin by the thousands for large-scale projects such as dam and canal construction, which were often far from their villages, so that the benefits of the Corvee could hardly be conveyed and the Fallahin from this work and alienated it from the central government which enforced it and whose benefit it lay.23 As the Fallahin began to plant cotton, sometimes under direct pressure, and at the same time stopped growing traditional subsistence products, their dependence on market developments grew. While the acreage for corn, wheat and beans was constantly decreasing, the proportion of land used for growing cotton increased steadily. In the summer of 1897, 1.5 million faddans of the total cultivated area of ​​1.67 million faddans were used for the cultivation of cotton.24

In the course of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, there was an increasing concentration of landed property in the hands of an ever decreasing number of wealthy landowners who leased a large part of their land. They provided the tenants with the necessary capital - seeds, fertilizer and irrigation - at the same time. The concentration of large estates was most pronounced in the provinces of the Delta that were first and most sustainably developed for cotton cultivation, as well as in the province of Fayum.25 The large landowners mostly lived as so-called "absentee landlords" in the regional centers and entrusted inspectors (Nazir, pl. Nuzzar), who had no social connection to the village community, with the protection of their interests vis-à-vis the tenants.

On the other hand, there was an increasing number of Fallahin who were heavily in debt and whose land was no longer sufficient to secure their livelihood. The consequences were expropriation and proletarianization. Although some of the Fallahin owned the land at least nominally, many were so heavily indebted that they in fact no longer owned the land. The results of the 1907 census show that only 6.6% of landowners have an area between 5 and 100 fad. and 17.5% had an area of ​​1-5 fad. On the other hand, there were 27.7% of the landowners who only had an area between 0 and one fad. owned, 11.7% tenants and 36.3% who lived as wage laborers in the country and were mainly employed during the cotton harvest.26

The fallahin with 0-1 fad estates. However, they can hardly be described as independent landowners, since this area was not sufficient to feed a family, neither through subsistence farming nor through the cultivation of cotton.In addition, these properties were often encumbered by mortgages. The same applies (e.g. due to different soil qualities) for parts of the landowners who own between 1 and 5 fad. .27 Nathan Brown believes that the number of families who subsisted on just one of the three options - leasing land or owning land for subsistence farming or growing cotton or wage labor - was very small: “... There was no typical peasant household; each pursued its own strategies for survival. "28

In Lower Egypt, which was most strongly characterized by the cultivation of so-called “cash crops”, the Fallahin indebtedness was higher than in areas where the subsistence economy played a role for a long time. One reason for this was that the rent, which made up a large part of the debt, was higher here. Often the Fallahin had to sell the expected harvest below its price in advance in order to pay off loans or to take out new loans. During the First World War, the Fallahin debt crisis worsened, with the result that around 10-15% of the small landowners lost their land during this period. The major agricultural banks, whose capital was almost exclusively in European hands, benefited from this development. In the years 1911 to 1919, for example, the amount of land expropriated in favor of the Agricultural Bank of Egypt increased tenfold (from 1320 fad. In 1911/1912 to 15,237 fad. In 1919/1920).29

In the course of colonization, the role of the “office” of the Umda, which is mostly in the hands of families of notables, also changed.30 They were integrated into the colonial state by placing them under the control of the provincial administration and entrusting them with administrative tasks. But they also lost traditional privileges to employees of the colonial administration, such as control over the water distribution in the village and the periodic redistribution of the musa land, which was abolished. To the extent that the local elites in the countryside were integrated into the administration of the state, their power was institutionalized and strengthened on the one hand, and their traditional legitimacy against the Fallahin was lost on the other.

A large number of village notables also migrated to the provincial towns, where a new, albeit very heterogeneous, class emerged. The so-called “Affandiya” comprised the merchants, traders and middlemen involved in the cotton trade as well as graduates of the new secular educational institutions, such as doctors, lawyers and state employees and journalists, many of whom had completed a European, mainly French-influenced education. 31

3. Traditions of the Fallahin Resistance in the 19th Century

The following section is intended to provide an overview of the various forms of social revolts and other forms of resistance against the colonization and transformation of Egyptian agrarian society described above in the 19th century up to the beginning of the First World War. These do not have a uniform appearance, as they were strongly shaped by regional differences, by different historical traditions and by the different degrees of colonization.

The presentation is not intended to be limited to the major revolts, but also to show the diverse manifestations of everyday resistance, which are often ignored in historical studies or are not even understood as resistance. The difficulties in examining the motivation and objectives of farmers' protests in any form have already been pointed out in the introduction. These are especially true for what can be defined as forms of "everyday individual resistance" that are difficult to grasp with social science methods. Nathan Brown comments on this problem: “Grumbling and pilfering leave few traces; those who grumble and pilfer may in fact hope that their identity, if not their actions go undetected "32 However, forms of individual resistance were probably the most widespread, as organizing an open uprising was associated with much greater risks. These forms expressed themselves, for example, in refusal, sabotage, slow work when drawing attention to the Corvee, as well as in flight and desertion.

The passive support of individuals or groups of insurgents on the part of a family or an entire village should, according to Brown, also be understood as resistance. This consisted, for example, in the refusal to cooperate with representatives of the state, in the protection of refugees and deserters and in the refusal to identify or testify against persons suspected of having committed crimes.33 Last but not least, such actions also harbored risks, since the imposition of collective punishments was a frequently used means of the state.

The main causes of the rural revolts of the 19th century lay in the restructuring of Egypt, which began under Muhammad Ali and which was integrated into the expanding world market through the state-monopolized cultivation of so-called "cash crops". In Egypt, which in comparison to the other regions of the Middle East had advanced furthest in this process in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the resulting social and economic change as well as the revolts against this development came first in appearance.34

Although there were frequent peasant uprisings in Egypt, especially in the first half of the 19th century, none of these uprisings could hold up for any length of time. In contrast to the uprisings in Lebanon (e.g. the social revolt in Kisrawan 1858-61, which led to the establishment of a peasant republic), which were favored by the geographical features of the region, even Upper Egypt did not present any comparable obstacles for the armies of the Central power, which was also much more developed in Egypt.35

Larger collective rebellions were above all spontaneous uprisings against specific grievances or a sudden deterioration in the material situation of the Fallahin, triggered by tax increases or famine. An important general characteristic of rural revolts is that they are tied to the agrarian calendar, which means that participation in them, for example, during the harvest and sowing period, is only possible to a limited extent.

The resistance of the Fallahin was initially directed against the enforcement of cotton cultivation under military coercion, against the increase in taxes and against the corvee, which was mainly used for the expansion and expansion of the irrigation system. For example, the cotton seeds were destroyed in order to convince the relevant government officials of the impossibility of growing cotton. The creation of a new type of army under Muhammad Ali, which was mainly composed of recruited Fallahin, harbored a further latent potential for conflict between the representatives of the central power or the colonial state and large parts of the rural population. The extensive recruitment had a serious impact on rural Egypt and was felt in every village and even in every family.36

The burdens that rested on the Egyptian Fallahin were only relieved somewhat when, under pressure from the European powers, Egypt was forced to reduce its army in 1841. The conflict also came to a head at times, for example when the Khedive decided to send an Egyptian expeditionary corps into the Crimean War.37 Those affected often reacted with self-mutilation in order to avoid being drafted into the army, and many mothers are said to have injured their sons as a child for this reason.38 It was also very common to flee to the cities or to inaccessible areas, such as swamps or to Bedouin tribes. Desertion, both individually and in larger groups and entire departments, was a widespread phenomenon in the peasant army created under Muhammad Ali. In the fight against social rebellions and Mahdi movements it happened again and again that parts of the armies used to suppress them joined the rebels.39

In the years 1823 and 1824 the Fallahin of the Delta Province of Manufiya rose against the introduction of new taxes and against recruitment under the leadership of local Suiuh. In 1854, the Bedouin tribes in the Fayum Basin and around Minya rebelled against their planned recruitment. Around 18,000 soldiers are said to have been deployed to fight the Bedouins, and all members of the Bani Hasib tribe were killed.40

A regionally specific form of rural movements that reacted to the new economic and social contradictions were the so-called "Mahdi movements" limited to Upper Egypt, which Schulze describes as "millenarian" or "quasi - millenarian movements".41 The belief in a Mahdi (that means one who is “rightly guided” or “under divine guidance”), with which a new era of justice is supposed to begin, is not only widespread among the Shiites, but also in Sunni popular Islam, especially in North Africa eschatological idea.

The geographical proximity of the Upper Egyptian area to the Higaz, which was an important center of Islamic renewal movements in the 18th and partly in the 19th century, encouraged the emergence of this type of movement. Important pilgrimage and trade routes ran here, leading via Qina and the port of Qusair to the Arabian Peninsula, along which certain religious ideas were spread.42

Islam played a decisive role in mobilizing the Fallahin for these (socially motivated) revolts. This found its expression in the country, among other things, in the form of a “popular Islam” shaped and supported by Sufi brotherhoods, which differed from the orthodoxy of the al-Azhar and was increasingly alienated by the reform movements of the 19th century such as the Salafiya has been.

In 1820 a man named Ahmad as-Salah appeared in the village of Salimiya in the province of Qina and mobilized the Fallahin of the surrounding villages with his religious sermons - according to some reports, the number of his followers grew to 40,000 and brought briefly - Large parts of the province under his control at an early stage. With him, however, it is not clear whether he saw himself as a Mahdi.43

Little is known about the rebellion that followed two years later under the leadership of Saih Ahmad al-Wazir. He declared himself a Mahdi and a saint, and through measures such as the expropriation of state warehouses and the expulsion of representatives of state power, he was able to win the approval of the Fallahin, thousands of which joined him. His mission (hidayat) called him "... to overthrow the tyrant Muhammad Ali and to establish an empire of" true Islam "."44 Only after several months could his movement be suppressed by Egyptian troops under the command of French officers.45

In 1824, a man named Ahmad ibn Idris appeared who led the insurgents in Qina Province who had revolted against the forced recruitment. He proclaimed, "... that he was sent by God and his prophet to end the suffering of the Egyptian fellahin and to judge Muhammad Ali (...)."46 He accused Muhammad Ali of having falsified Islam through innovations (bid a). His peasant army (some reports speak of 40,000 Fallahin), reinforced by deserters from the troops deployed to suppress them, moved down the Nile towards Lower Egypt, but was defeated in June of the same year.47

The Mahdi Rebellion in 1865 was also the last movement of its kind. A cholera epidemic claimed almost 250,000 lives that year, and there was also a famine in Central and Upper Egypt, which was caused by the neglect of grain cultivation in favor of cotton cultivation. In this situation a man named Ahmad, nicknamed at-Tayib, declared himself a Mahdi. A British contemporary of events who was touring Upper Egypt at the time reported that his goal was: “... to divide all property equally, and to kill the Ulama and destroy all theological teaching by learned men and preach a sort of revolution or interpretation of the Koran of his own. "A Saih she knew described Ahmad at-Tayib as a" ... mad fanatic and communist. "48 The Fallahin joined him in their thousands and were able to take control of almost all of Girga Province. This uprising was also suppressed with great cruelty. Ahmad at-Tayib is said to have been revered for years as a kind of Messiah whose return was expected in the near future.49

The expansion of the infrastructure, especially the road and rail network, which was accelerated in the 1950s, promoted the integration of the Upper Egyptian area into the agricultural expansion (Asyut was connected to the rail network in 1874). The increased development of Upper Egypt for the colonial state made it possible at the same time to have greater control of this region and made it difficult or impossible to re-emerge major rebellions. The Urabi uprising and the fight against the occupation of Egypt by the British in 1882 meant a turning point before the great revolt of 1919 because of the numerous involvement of the Fallahin. The social and economic background and the course of this conflict cannot be adequately dealt with here . It should be noted, however, that the Urabi uprising in some provinces of the Delta and Upper Egypt was also accompanied by independent rural social revolts, only partly related to the struggle against the British.50

The further development since the 80s shows that the great revolts, which in the first half of the 19th century had shaped the image of the resistance of the Fallahin, are being replaced by other forms of social protest due to the changed social and economic conditions, e.g. through strikes by farm workers, refusal to pay rents or an increased occurrence of rural “brigands”, which until then had been practiced mainly by Bedouins.

An increasing number of the Fallahin who had lost their land migrated to the poor districts of the cities or, in order to secure their livelihood, joined armed gangs, often also led by landless people.51

The structures of these groups, their goals and methods and their relationships with the villages were by no means uniform. Probably a variety of manifestations existed, from groups that fed their own families and villages by raiding other villages or travelers, to groups that sought to ensure their own survival completely detached from the social structures of their surroundings. But their target was above all the developing private property of the large landowners. In this context Schulze even speaks of tendencies towards socially motivated banditry, "... whose ideal type proceeded according to the motto" take the rich and give to the poor "."52 With this assertion, however, he runs the risk of idealizing these gangs, whose primary goal was to improve their own material situation or to ensure survival.

Although the authorities responded by setting up special units to combat brigand groups and enacting a law allowing them to banish people who "endangered the security of the country" to internal oases, the numbers were able to increase of the "crimes" in the country do not prevent. In 1904 a first gun law was passed that forbade the possession of firearms, except for members of the upper classes.53

In addition to the sensational appearance of the brigand groups, the various forms of resistance mentioned at the beginning of the dissolving village communities continued to exist, which defended themselves against encroachments on their rights (or what they viewed as their rights).

Brown and Barakat name various actions of collective, spontaneous resistance for the last decades of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, each of which was restricted to the residents of a village. These included organized refusals to work, land occupations, the demolition of a dike that cut off the fields of a village from irrigation, as well as individual and collective attacks on large landowners and their administrators and members of the royal family. There were often clashes with the police or the British military. In many cases the protests were led by the Suiuh or Umad of the respective villages, and the active participation of women was not uncommon.54

Individual attacks on large landowners were, however, as these often lived in the cities, rather seldom in contrast to attacks on the rural employees of the "absentees" and the agricultural societies.Russel writes: “At one time most big agricultural estates in Egypt were run by a Greek nazir (superintendent): today I doubt if there are any left, they have all been either shot or frightened away. Even an Egyptian nazir takes severe risks when trying to enforce discipline on an estate by punishing or dismisssing a laborer for laziness or disobedience, often paying for it with his life. "55

The event that caused the most attention in this context and is often seen as the "turning point" in the history of the Egyptian national movement was the so-called Dinsawi incident in 1906. The residents of the village of Dinsawi had attacked British soldiers who were hunting pigeons wounded a resident near the village; a British officer was killed. The British military authorities then arrested 59 residents and brought them to a military tribunal which sentenced four of them to death, eight to public flogging and a further number to long sentences, including life sentences.

The urban national movement, which until then had opposed or ignored the Fallah resistance, managed to use the event for its own purposes by styling the residents of Dinsawi as “martyrs” for the national cause.56 The period of British occupation up to the end of World War I and the subsequent revolts of 1919 was nevertheless the longest period in recent Egyptian history in which there were no major rural revolts such as the Mahdi revolts of the 1920s .

4. The "National Revolution" of 1919 and the Fallahin revolts

4.1. First World War and Protectorate

The inclusion of Egypt in the First World War had an impact on all parts of Egyptian society, especially on the rural population. The integration of the country into the war economy system of Great Britain required direct and immediate control of its resources and the subordination of all economic activities to the aim of winning the war. During the war years, the authority of the colonial state or the claim to power of Great Britain was enforced by military means in all parts of the country, whereby the autochthonous authorities and the Egyptian administration were integrated even more firmly into the colonial state.

On October 18, 1914, a general ban on assembly was issued, and on November 2, 1914, General Sir John Maxwell, commander of British troops in Egypt, declared martial law. On December 18 In 1914 Egypt officially became a British mandate and the colonial administration declared the Khedives Abbas II, who was in Istanbul at the time, to be deposed.

The heavy burdens of the war, which in particular had to be borne by the Fallahin, were the immediate cause of the rebellions in 1919 which were to sweep all parts of the country. More and more Egyptians were forced to serve in newly created units of the British Army, such as the Egyptian Labor Corps (ELC) and the Camel Transport Corps (CTC), which were mainly used for logistical tasks on the Ottoman front. In the summer of 1917 a committee was created in the British Army to deal with the coordination of recruitment. For the recruiting of the recruits, however, the employees of the Egyptian administration had to take on the responsibility, which was passed on from the Mudir of a province to the Ma mur of a Markaz to the Umda of a village.

First and foremost, it was the poor who could not afford to bribe the responsible Umda who filled the ranks of the ELC and the CTC. About 500,000 Egyptians are said to have served in these units at the same time, some of them also in France. Between March 1917 and June 1918 alone, over 320,000 Fallahin were recruited.57 Since the end of 1917, the seizure of draft animals for the army began, for which fixed prices were paid that were far below the actual value.

The economic situation in Egypt during the war revealed the problems that arise from the dependence on cultivation and export of only one agricultural product. The British authorities tried to counteract the strong fluctuations in the cotton price with dirigistic measures, mainly because they initially feared supply bottlenecks for their own war economy.

A "Cotton Control Commission" set up in 1918 took over the purchase of the entire cotton harvest at fixed prices, but without taking the strong inflation into account. The "Supplies Control Board", also created in 1918, worked in a similar way and was responsible for registering all basic foodstuffs and purchasing them at fixed prices. These measures led to an additional impoverishment of the Fallahin, who were already suffering from debt and inflation.58

While the resistance of the Fallahin in the first years of the war was mainly limited to individual refusal, such as fleeing from recruitment, in the further course of the war there were also collective counter-actions that led to clashes with the army.59 Brigand groups also appeared more strongly again due to the worsening social conditions, with a development away from such groups, which previously existed in a “symbiosis” with the villages, towards “... self-sufficient bandit groups that also attacked their home villages “Is to be determined.60 The number of attacks on administrative officials, Suyuh and Umad, who combined tasks delegated to them by the colonial administration with corruption, arbitrariness and enrichment and who became increasingly alienated from the Fallahin, increased sharply. The British authorities responded to the unrest in the countryside and the nationalist agitation in the cities with intensified repression. In 1915 alone, around 100,000 firearms are said to have been confiscated during raids on the countryside.61 By 1917, 56 people had been deported to Malta and 592 people were interned in the Dahla and Harga prison camps, most of them nationalist politicians.62

4.2. The uprising in the metropolises

The parties founded in Egypt at the beginning of the 20th century were generally only associations of a few urban intellectuals with a European influence. The first party of European type (with formal membership, a party program and elected functionaries) is the Hizb al-Watani, founded in 1907, whose members and sympathizers were mainly members of the urban middle class. Just like Hizb al Umma, founded in 1907, whose founders were almost exclusively influential large landowners, they saw their most important goal in the complete independence of Egypt.

The Hizb al-Ummah wanted to achieve this goal with the help of the Ottoman Sultan, by appealing to Islam as a “connecting element”, while the Hizb al-Watani wanted both the British, the Osmanns and the rule of the Khedives understood as forms of foreign rule that stood in the way of the “national interests” of Egypt.63 On November 13, 1918 (the day later to be referred to as yaum al-gihad), the former members of Hizb al-Umma, Za d Zaglul, Ali Sa rawi and Abdal aziz Fahmi, met with the British High Commissioner Wingate to discuss him to submit their demands for an end to the protectorate and the complete independence of the country. B. made with regard to the control of the canal zone by Great Britain.64 The claim of the delegation (Wafd) to represent the entire Egyptian nation should be underpinned with a signature campaign (Taukilat) throughout the country. To counter the increased nationalist agitation, Za d Zaglul and several of his followers were deported to Malta on March 8, 1919.

A series of demonstrations was then held in Cairo and Alexandria, which, especially in the first phase, were largely supported and organized by lawyers and students. Strikes and demonstrations paralyzed large parts of the infrastructure, such as urban transport, parts of the public service and the Alexandrian ports. Al-Azhar in Cairo played a central role in the mobilization for the actions, at which large gatherings were held every day for weeks, at which up to 30,000 people of all classes, genders and religions should have taken part.65

However, the movement did not have a uniform character, so that it would not be permissible to speak of a "national revolution". The classes involved, their specific demands and the way in which their protest was expressed were too different. For example, the work stoppages and acts of sabotage by the still weak trade union movement were only partially motivated by nationalism. Above all, social demands, such as the introduction of an eight-hour day, were in the foreground and could in part also be enforced.66

4.3. The revolts in the provincial towns and in the countryside

The revolt spread in mid-March 1919, starting from the metropolises of Cairo and Alexandria, via the provincial cities, to the villages and quickly spread across the entire country. The British authorities and the leadership of the national movement were taken by surprise at the scale of the rebellion. The British army, which initially had to limit itself to protecting important bases and the infrastructure (especially in the canal zone), lost control of large parts of Egypt.

Approximately 3,000 Egyptians were believed to be killed in the course of the events, with the British figures being lower and the Egyptian figures being higher. Large parts of the infrastructure, such as the railway lines, were destroyed in the course of the uprising, around 100 villages were razed to the ground during the reconquest of rural areas and through collective punitive measures by the British army.

In addition to lawyers and journalists, the Cairo students in particular contributed to the politicization of the population in the provinces, especially the students of al-Azhar, of whom 30-40% came from the provinces. British intelligence sources have repeatedly expressed concern about the presence of Azhar students in the countryside, who informed the population of the situation in Cairo, distributed leaflets and helped organize and guide protests. The closure of schools and universities due to the strikes in March meant that even students who did not take part in the activities were able to return to their villages and report on the situation in Cairo.67

The Taukilat campaign in November 1918 had also contributed to a mobilization, even if it was not explicitly aimed at the Fallahin, but primarily at the members of the Affandiya and the provincial notables. The events in the country show that the leadership of the Wafd did not succeed, even when they tried to mobilize the rural population in the spirit of their nationalism.

It was presumably not the deportation from Sa d Zaglul to Malta, but the news of the bloody clashes in Cairo that followed the deportation that prompted the revolt in the provinces.

In the days between March 10th and 15th, rallies and demonstrations began in all provincial cities of the country, initially mainly by members of the Affandia (employees, lawyers, merchants), by local notables, as well as by students and Students were worn. Often these demonstrations were led by al-Azhar students who had to flee Cairo to avoid repression. Since many of them were sons of notables, they were able to combine the authority of their traditional position with the authority of a student at one of the most important universities in the Islamic world.

The longer the demonstrations went on, the more clashes there were with the British military and police. There were many deaths on the part of the demonstrators, e.g. in Buhaira and Zaqaziq on March 16, in Rasid and Mansura on March 18, in Fayum on March 19 and in Port Said on March 21.68

In some provincial towns and villages, the army even used airplanes to fight the insurgents, for example in Asyut and Qalyub, where the demonstrators cut rail and telegraph connections and blocked the access roads to the city.69 In Tanta, following a demonstration, several thousand people attacked the train station on March 12, with many dead on their side when the British military opened fire. The majority of the dead were students from Ahmadi University, many of the dead also came from the surrounding villages, a fact that suggests that the Fallahin took part in the demonstrations in the city from the start.70 The city of Tanta, in which the grave of the famous Sufi Ahmad al-Badawi is located, is one of the most important centers in the worship of saints in popular Islam and, due to the annual Maulid, is a great attraction for the surrounding villages. Schulze therefore suspects that the revolt in Tanta was motivated more religiously than nationalistically because of the strong religious tradition.71

The first acts of sabotage were also carried out in Tanta when the Fallahin in the region disrupted the railway line to Tala on March 12.

In mid-March, national committees were formed in at least 12 provincial cities, made up of representatives of the Affandiya, local notables, including Saihs, and in some cases Coptic clergymen.72 The committees did not have a uniform character, nor did they always strive for the same goals. Even the group of notables appeared by no means uniform, but rather their representatives were influenced by local particular interests and feuds in their political positioning.

In some cities, such as Zifta and Zaqaziq, the leading notables of the committees proclaimed independent republics, which, however, did not see themselves as decidedly anti-royalist, but whose main goal was complete independence (Istiqlal tam) from Great Britain. Many notables preferred a constitutional monarchy and a state organized according to the corporate principles of the ancient Egyptian constitution.73 In view of the collapse of the state order, its primary task was to build structures that would protect the old social order from possible attacks. Above all, they tried to maintain “peace and order” and to control or integrate the rebellious Fallahin and Bedouins and to hold them back from independent actions directed against the life and private property of the notables.74

The development in the provincial towns clearly shows a tendency towards decentralization of the revolt, which also continued in the villages, so that at least at this stage one can no longer speak of a “national uprising” or a “national revolution”. Rather, it becomes clear that there were a large number of local and regional revolts, whose motivation and objectives and the choice of their means were influenced by local factors such as the different extent of colonial penetration, the property and production conditions at the place and not least also depended on the historical resistance traditions from the 19th century.

The problems of the scientific investigation of peasant movements and protests have already been pointed out above. In particular, the question of the causes of the revolts or the motivation of their participants and their objectives is difficult to answer due to the lack of written tradition (programs, leaflets, memoirs, etc.) of the participants themselves. While British sources are primarily horrified at the outbreak of violence, denouncing the Fallahin as a criminal and the rebellion as a criminal,75 Many Egyptian and other authors try to make the Fallahin the object of nationalistic wishful thinking. The most superficial analysis comes from Nadav Safran, who claims “... The whole Nation, fellah and pasha, illiterate and educated, Muslims and Copts, men and woman stood behind Sa d Zaghlul, fighting with great courage and heavy sacrifice in apparent support of the Liberal Nationalist ideals he represented. "76

Even when the rural rebels adopted catchphrases and slogans from urban nationalists, they very likely associated other ideas with them. What did it mean for the Fallahin when they made demands for “freedom” (hurriya), “justice” (adl) and “independence” (istiqlal or istiqlal tam)? First and foremost, they understood this to mean independence and freedom from state authorities and instruments of coercion that determined their daily lives, and not exclusively freedom from British occupation, which the members of the Affandiya had set as their goal.For the Fallahin, “freedom” and “independence” meant above all the restoration of village autonomy and only secondly the independence of the country from foreign powers.

For the Fallahin, resistance to colonialism and colonization consisted not only in the defeat of the British army, but also included the destruction of the institutions of colonial society and the state in its immediate vicinity, those institutions which the Wafd sought to take over under national auspices.77

The immediate material causes of the revolts in the countryside lay in British politics during the First World War and its consequences for the Fallahin: increasing indebtedness, impoverishment and hunger.78

Although the revolts in the provinces began around March 15, 1919, most studies assume that there was no unified organization or coordination or even a call for a nationwide uprising.79 This is supported by the fact that there were hardly any political organizations in the country, that nationalism was mainly limited to urban strata and that the nationalist parties were also not interested in mobilizing the Fallahin. In addition, all connections from Cairo to the provinces had been interrupted since March 15, so that even the representatives of the Wafd and the political parties in Cairo received only fragmentary information about the events in the provinces.

The organizational framework of the rebels in the country was primarily the village community and, on a larger scale, the amalgamation of Fallahin several villages in a region for joint actions. Due to insufficient information in the sources and in the literature, it is not possible to identify the rebels in more detail and to give differentiated information about the different participation of farm workers, tenants or small landowners. The extent of the participation of women has not been examined in more detail been.80 The Fallahin were often led by local notables, in some cases also by students of the al-Azhar or by members of the village administration, such as police officers, which is evidence of adherence to the traditional village authority structures.81 The organizers and leaders, however, are almost nowhere known by name.

In the village of Fariskur in Daqahliya province, it was the deputy commander of the police who armed the Fallahin with rifles from the police station and called on them to destroy the railway line to Dumyat.82 In the village of Minyat al-Qamh in Sarqiya province, the entire police force even took part in the rebellion under the command of their officer. After a series of demonstrations and looting, Australian forces occupied the village and took several prisoners. Thereupon the Fallahin of the village attacked the train station together with the police and fought a battle with the soldiers, who were supported by a military aircraft, in order to free the prisoners again.83

In most cases, the first actions of the insurgents were directed against the infrastructure of the state. They destroyed railway lines and stations, telephone and telegraph lines, with the result that connections in large parts of the country were interrupted, these areas became uncontrollable for the British army and representatives of the central authority and had to be given up. The Fallahin succeeded for a short time in restoring the autonomy of the village community vis-à-vis the colonial state and its representatives

Unlike in Cairo and Alexandria, where members of the Greek minority, especially unionized workers, took part in strikes and demonstrations, the Greeks in the provinces and their property were the target of attacks by the fellahin. In almost all cities and villages in the delta region and in Middle Egypt where Greeks lived, Greek shops were looted and the Greek inhabitants were expelled, who were evidently considered by the majority of the population as not belonging to the village community. One of the reasons for the pogrom-like riots was certainly the Fallahin's indebtedness to local moneylenders and middlemen, many of whom were of Greek origin.84

There were similar phenomena in Upper Egypt, where the country's revolts spread to the larger cities. In Minya and Asyut, the Fallahin looted all Coptic shops after storming the cities. Schulze explains these attacks not from a general, religiously determined hostility towards the Copts, but from the fundamental antagonism between the village and the urban, colonial society, which is dominated by a strong Coptic minority in the Upper Egyptian cities. The attacks were aimed at this society, its institutions and representatives, and not the Copts as a religious group, since the Copts in the countryside, which after all also make up the majority of the Coptic population, were not the target of attacks.85

British soldiers and facilities directly related to the coercive measures taken by the British Army during World War I were another target of the insurgents. Depots in which confiscated food was stored were ransacked; Prisoners were freed, for example in Manuf, where the village's Markaz was stormed and the Fallahin held there, who had been forcibly recruited into the Egyptian Labor Corps, were cleared.86

The most sensational attack on British soldiers took place on March 18 in Dairut, Upper Egypt. The residents of the village stopped a train coming from Luxor to Cairo at the station and killed eight British soldiers and officers, including the prison inspector in Upper Egypt.87

An express train on its way to Cairo was also attacked in Qalyub station and a British soldier was killed.88

While in general the rebellion was hardly directed against the traditional ruling classes, but, as stated on the contrary, was cited by them, in some regions it was directed not only against the central government but also against the state and private landed property of the notables.

The leadership of the Wafd in Cairo and the urban bourgeoisie viewed the acts of violence and rebellions in the provinces, over which they could no longer influence, with concern and tried to distance themselves from them: “The Mass Participation of the 1919 Revolution frightened the wafd, for it represented the entry of groups who did not share their style or class. "89 Even the national committees established in the provincial towns, which in the face of the dissolving state authority tried to preserve the social status quo, could not prevent the Fallah from changing the character of a revolt of "... a political revolution against the [British ] Occupation, into a social revolution ... "90 transformed.

This aspect of the revolts came to the fore especially in the northern delta provinces, Garbiya, Sarqiya and Daqahliya, which were the first to be affected by the restructuring of agriculture to cotton in the 19th century, where colonization was most advanced where an above-average number of large estates (foreign and Egyptian) contrasted with an ever decreasing number of small and medium-sized landowners. The traditional position of the notables in this region had apparently been weakened due to the new relations of production and dependency so that they could hardly influence the fall.

The rebellions here had taken on the character of a comprehensive social revolt, whereby the organization and the scope of action of the insurgents remained locally limited, as everywhere.

The rebellions of the rebellious Fallahin also took place in these provinces in the forms of action described above, such as attacks against the infrastructure and against the British army or the police, with the aim of restoring village autonomy. In addition, they were directed primarily against the large state and private domains. Cotton silos, granaries and administrative buildings of the large estates as well as local branches of the agricultural banks were looted and set on fire, machines (for coring and packing the cotton), steam plows and irrigation pumps were destroyed.91

In Daqahliya province, all of the larger estates (izab) are said to have been destroyed. There were also frequent land occupations because the owners of the large estates were no longer able to enforce their claim to ownership due to the uncertain situation for them. For example, a canal bridge between Mansura and Simballawain was destroyed, which resulted in the flooding of large cotton plantations. The Fallahin of the surrounding villages then planted rice in these fields, which belonged to a large landowner.92 In Upper Egypt, too, there were attacks against notables and their property, as well as sometimes armed clashes between supporters of the National Committees and insurgent Fallahin. In Minya, the National Committee, which had placed itself under the protection of Egyptian troops, was dismissed by the insurgents.93 In Asyut, the Fallahin rebels, supported by Bedouins, plundered large parts of the city and attacked the representatives of the National Committee there. So they tried to storm the seat of the Sulaiman family, who were among the richest landowners in the area and whose relatives Muhammad Mahmud had been deported to Malta as a member of the Wafd.94

Despite numerous examples of a social revolt in Upper Egypt, however, the “anti-state tendencies” of the rebellions generally predominated. One must remember, however, that the specific structures of the different provinces influenced the appearance of the revolts, which was also not uniform here in Upper Egypt. The large, whole-region-wide uprisings against the large estates, as in some of the delta provinces, did not seem to exist in Upper Egypt.95 In contrast to Schulze and Barakat, Nathan Brown, in my opinion, wrongly denies the relevance of the social rebellions during the “revolution” of 1919 in general. This has often been exaggerated. Attacks on large landowners were directed primarily against opponents of the “revolution” and did not arise out of social motivation.96

The uprising was mainly suppressed by the brutal actions of the British Army. Despite the destruction of the infrastructure and bitter resistance, the army was able to regain control of Egypt within a few weeks. However, some areas were not recaptured until mid-April, as each village had to be pacified individually by British troops. The Fallahin could not counter the use of armored trains, airplanes and even ships that were sent to Upper Egypt because of the destroyed railway connections on the Nile. The imposition of severe collective punishments also contributed to ending the revolts. In order to counter the destruction of the railroad connections and stations, the British Army Command issued an order on March 20, after the village closest to the location of the attack was to be burned down.97

At the political level, however, an understanding was reached between the representative of Great Britain - General Allenby, who was appointed the new High Commissioner on March 21, and the representatives of the Notables and the Afandiya, in whose common interest it was “... the To preserve the statehood of the colonial system and its economic order ... "98. Both were endangered by the social and anti-state revolts in the countryside. On March 24, leading notables in the country, including the Saih der al-Azhar, the Mufti of Egypt, the Coptic Patriarch and leaders of the Wafd, issued a statement calling for an end to the rebellion and compliance with the law.99 The British, too, were obviously keen to accommodate the Wafd, so Allenby ordered on April 7th that the exiles in Malta were to be released.100

After the British army had recaptured the rural area, the Wafd founded regional committees in all the provinces in the summer of the same year, which were to serve as pillars in the struggle for their political goals, especially the achievement of independence. A repetition of the uncontrollable events of March 1919, which in many ways contradicted the interests of the Wafd-bearing classes, should be avoided. With the establishment of the Egyptian, bourgeois, European-influenced elites, who were finally accepted by the British as negotiating partners, "... the real modernity of Egyptian social history" began. "The prerequisite was the elimination of the last autochthonous forms of resistance that had determined the picture of the March revolt."101

5. Conclusion

The purpose of this work is to examine the causes and backgrounds and the different manifestations of the rebellion of the Egyptian Fallahin during the “revolution” of 1919. First of all, the process of colonization of the Egyptian agrarian society, which was largely connected with the introduction of cotton cultivation at the beginning of the 19th century, and the resulting conflicts with the colonial state were presented. Although major peasant uprisings (apart from the Mahdi rebellions in Upper Egypt) were rather rare due to the increasing assertiveness of the central state, there was always a broad repertoire of individual and collective forms of resistance with which the Fallahin opposed the colonization of their living environment and defended the interventions in their traditional rights associated with it.

With regard to the rebellions in 1919, it has been shown that there was no uprising planned and coordinated by a central authority against the British occupation and for an independent Egyptian nation-state Rather, there was a multitude of parallel revolts, which in their course had some similarities, but also strong differences. The immediate background for the simultaneity of the revolts and for their outbreak was the restoration of colonialism that took place in the course of the First World War, which affected all areas of Egyptian society, and the consequences of which, above all, had to bear the fall. The aim of their revolts was not, as was the case with the leaders of the national movement, to gain power in the colonial state, but to destroy its symbols and institutions and to expel its representatives from their immediate environment. In some provinces, where the Fallahin was primarily directed against the landowners and their property, the uprisings took on the character of a sweeping social revolt. The leadership of the rebels was mostly in the hands of the local notables as well as members of the village administrative level, who apparently were not viewed or attacked as representatives of the colonial state.

Due to the limited scope of the work, some aspects that are important in connection with the colonization of Egypt, such as the strategic and economic interests of France and Great Britain, the debt crisis and the forced administration of the country by the European powers, could not be dealt with become. The uprisings of the Bedouin tribes and their participation in the rebellions in 1919 could not be dealt with either.

6. List of sources and references


Amin, Mustafa, al-kitab al-mamnu. Asrar taurat 1919, Vols 1 and 2, Cairo 1974 and 1975

Beinin, Joel, Lockmann, Zarachry, Workers on the Nile. Nationalism, Communism, Islam, and the Egyptian Working Class, 1882-1954, Princeton 1987

Baer, ​​Gabriel, Fellah and Townsman in the Middle East. Studies in Social History, London 1982

Baer, ​​Gabriel, A History of Landownership in Modern Egypt, London 1962

Baer, ​​Gabriel, Studies in the Social History of Modern Egypt, Chicago, London 1969

Barakat, Ali, tatauwur al- milkiya az- zira iya fi misr 1813-1914 wa ataruhu ala- l- haraka as- siyasiya, Cairo 1977

Barakat, Ali, al- fallahun baina at- taura al- urabiya wa taura 1919, in: al- Magalla at- ta rihiya almisriya 22/1975, pp. 201 ff

Brown, Nathan, Peasant Politics in Modern Egypt: The Struggle against the State, New Haven, London 1990

Burke Edmund III, Changing Patterns of Peasant Protest in the Middle East, 1750-1950, in: Kazemi, Farhad, Waterbury, John (ed.), Peasants and Politics in the Modern Middle East, Miami 1991, p. 24 ff

Cuno, Kenneth M., The Pasha’s Peasants.Land, Society and Economy in Lower Egypt, 1740-1858, Cambridge 1992

Cuno, Kenneth M., The Origins of Private Ownership of Land in Egypt: A Reappraisal, in: IJMES12 / 1980, p. 245 ff

Deeb, Marius, The 1919 Popular Uprising. A Genesis of Egyptian Nationalism, in: Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism 1, 1973, pp. 106 ff

Deeb, Marius, Party Politics in Egypt: The Wafd and its Rivals, 1919-1939, London 1973

Deeb, Marius, The Socioeconomic Role of the Local Foreign Minorities in Modern Egypt 1805- 1961, in: IJMES 9/1, 1978, p. 11 ff

Fieldhouse, D. K., Economics and Empire 1830-1914, London 1973

Gershoni, I., Pankowski, J. P., Egypt, Islam and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian Nationhood 1900 - 1930, New York 1986

Hobsbawm, Eric J., Social Rebels. Archaic social movements in the 19th and 20th centuries, Giessen 1979

Lawson, Fred H., Rural Revolt and Provincial Society in Egypt, 1820-1824, in: IJMES 13/1981, p.131 ff

Lockman, Z., Beinin, J., Workers on the Nile: Nationalism, Communism, Islam and the Egyptian Working Class 1882-1954, London 1988

Migdal, Joel, Peasants, Politics and Revolution, Princeton 1974

Owen, E.R.J., Cotton and the Egyptian Economy, 1820-1914, Oxford 1969

Quraishi, Zaher, Masood, Liberal Nationalism in Egypt: Rise and Fall of the Wafd Party, Allahabad 1967

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Richards, Alan, Egypts Agricultural Development 1800-1980, Boulder 1982

Ruskay, John, Expanding Noninstitutional Mass Political Participation: The Role of Voluntary Groups in the Egyptian Revolution of 1919, New York, unpublished. Ph. Diss., Columbia University 1977

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Schulze, Reinhard, Colonization and Resistance: The Egyptian Peasant Revolts of 1919, in: Schölch, Alexander, Mejcher, Helmut (eds.), The Egyptian Society in the 20th Century, Hamburg 1992, p. 11 ff

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1 The most important works on this topic are: Brown, Nathan, Peasant Politics in Modern Egypt. The Struggle against the State, New Haven, London 1990; Schulze, Reinhard, The rebellion of the Egyptian Fellahin. On the conflict between the agrarian-oriental society and the colonial state in Egypt 1820-1919, Berlin 1981; Barakat, Ali, al- fallahun baina at- taura al- urabiya wa taura 1919, in: al- magalla at- ta rihiya al- misriya 22/1975, p. 201 ff and as a comparative study of the various countries of the fertile crescent and Egypt: Baer, ​​Gabriel, Fellah and Townsman in the Middle East. Studies in Social History, London 1982; Burke, Edmund III, Changing Patterns of Peasant Politics in the Middle East, 1750- 1950, in: Kazemi, Farhad, Waterbury, John (ed.), Peasant Politics in the modern Middle East, Miami 1991, p. 24 ff

2 Due to the limited topic of the work, only a part of these was used.

3 ar- Rafi i, Abdarrahman, taurat sanat 1919. Tarih misr al qaumi min 1914-1921, Cairo 1955

4 Ruskay, John, Expanding Noninstitutional Mass Political Participation: The Role of Voluntary Groups in the Egyptian Revolution of 1919, unpublished. Ph. Diss., Columbia University 1977

5 Milner, Sir Alfred, England in Egypt, London 1899, p. 314 and p. 317 A British officer stationed in Egypt expressed himself in a similarly disparaging manner in a letter from 1916: “I have never seen such funny people as the natives here . They are a low, thieving, lying set of ragamuffins, but most amusing. ", Hopwood, Derek (Ed.), Tales of Empire. The British in the Middle East 1880-1952, London 1989, p. 58

6 See: Cromer, The Earl of, Today's Egypt, Vol. 1 and 2, Berlin 1908, pp. 185 ff; Milner, Sir Alfred, supra, p. 79; Similar views of the achievements of British colonial policy still exist today. See Steele, David, Britain and Egypt 1882-1914: The Containment of Islamic Nationalism, in: Wilson Keith M. (Ed.), Imperialism and Nationalism in the Middle East. The Anglo-Egyptian Experience 1882-1982, London 1983

7 Schulze, Reinhard, Colonization and Resistance: The Egyptian Peasant Revolts of 1919, in: Schölch, Alexander, Mejcher, Helmut (eds.), The Egyptian Society in the 20th Century, Hamburg 1992, p. 11 ff

8 See: Burke, Edmund III, op. Cit., P. 32

9 See Baer, ​​Gabriel, Studies in the Social History of Modern Egypt, Chicago, London 1969, p. 17

10 More recent work, such as by Kenneth Cuno, relativizes a large part of the results of older research. So it is a great simplification to transfer the term “subsistence economy” to the agrarian society of the 18th century. A market-oriented policy as well as market relations in the country had already existed in the 18th century and were only deepened by Muhammad Ali, but not reintroduced. See: Cuno, Kenneth M., The Pasha’s Peasants ,. Society, and Economy in Lower Egypt, 1740-1858, Cambridge 1992, pp. 198/199

11 This assessment is also partly called into question in modern research, especially by Cuno. Although the state was at least officially in possession of the entire land up to the end of the 18th century, the multazims could have asserted and asserted very extensive rights for themselves in the course of the 18th century, which would have been very similar to those of landowners , so that the original form of this system only existed in rudiments: "... multazims in Egypt succeeded in transforming their iltizams into a form of private property in land." Cuno, Kenneth M., The Origins of Private Ownership of Land in Egypt: A Reappraisal, in: IJMES 12/1980, p. 245, p. 251 Cuno also contradicts Ali Barakat's claim that Muhammad Ali distributed the land to the Fallahin in small plots: “... to do so would have been to give land to families who lacked all of the resources needed to cultivate it and pay its tax, and thus hinder the growth of agriculture and revenues. "; Cuno, Kenneth M., The Pasha’s Peasants, op. Cit., P. 112 Cf.: Barakat, Ali, al- fallhun, op. Cit., P. 202

12 See: Barakat, Ali, tatauwur al-milkiya az-zira iya fi misr 1813-1914 wa ataruhu ala-l-haraka as-siyasiya, Kairo 1977, p.192 ff

13 See: Barakat, Ali, tatauwur al-milkiya az-zira iya, op. Cit., P. 233; The different legal titles on land (e.g. Giflik, Masmuh, etc.), their distribution and taxation (e.g. Haragiya or UsuriyaLand) as well as their historical development cannot be discussed in more detail here.

14 See: Owen, E. R. J., Cotton and the Egyptian Economy, 1820-1914, Oxford 1969, pp. 40 ff

15 See: Owen, E. R., J., op. Cit., P. 65; Barakat, Ali, tatawur al-milkiya az-zira iya, op. Cit., P. 50 5

16 Compare: Schulze, Reinhard, Die Rebellion der ägyptischen Fellahin, loc. Cit., P. 33; Owen, E.R.J., p. 89 ff

17 See Umar, Hasim Sa id, Qutun fi-l-iqtisad al-misr, Cairo 1970, p. 28

18 See: Barakat, Ali, tatawur al-milkiya az-zira iya, loc. Cit., Pp. 191/192

19 See: Schulze, Reinhard, Die Rebellion der Ägyptischen Fellahin, op. Cit., P. 38 6

20 See: Owen, E.R.J., loc. Cit., P. 47; Richards, Alan, Egypts Agricultural Development 1800-1980, Boulder 1982, p. 21

21 See Schulze, Reinhard, Die Rebellion der ägyptischen Fellahin, op. Cit., P. 38 ff; Milner, Sir Alfred, England in Egypt, London 1899, p. 248 ff

22 See: Brown, Nathan, op. Cit., P. 37

23 See: Barakat, Ali, tatawur al-milkiya az-zira iya, loc. Cit., Pp. 32/33; Brown, Nathan, supra, pp. 73/74; Cuno, Kenneth M., The Pasha’s Peasants, op cit, p. 123; Richards, Alan, supra, pp. 22/23;

24 Cf .: Brown, Nathan, op. Cit., P. 26 The area measure Feddan (hereinafter abbreviated as "Fad.") Described an area that varied continuously during the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries depending on a subordinate unit of measurement. During the years 1813-1820 one fad corresponded. about 4416 m2 ; since 1821 it was about 4200 m2. See: Cuno, Kenneth, The Pasha’s Peasants, loc. Cit., Pp. 209/210

25 Cf .: Brown, Nathan, op. Cit., Pp. 36/37 The illustration can only show the rough scheme of the development. With regard to the distribution of land, there were also large regional differences within individual provinces.

26 See: Schulze, Reinhard, Die Rebellion der ägyptischen Fellahin, loc. Cit., P. 61

27 See: Schölch, Alexander, European expansion and the transformation of Egypt 1760-1922, in: Grevemeyer, Jan-Heeren (ed.), Traditional societies and European colonialism, Frankfurt / M 1981, p. 144

28 Brown, Nathan, op. Cit., 34

29 See: Schulze, Reinhard, Die Rebellion der ägyptischen Fellahin, op. Cit., P. 102 ff

30 The terms Umda and Saih albalad, which were often used synonymously in the 19th century, are translated in English with the term “village headman”.

31 See: Schulze, Reinhard, Die Rebellion der Ägyptischen Fellahin, loc. Cit., P. 98

32 Brown, Nathan, op. Cit., P. 9

33 See: Brown, Nathan, op. Cit., Pp. 86/87, pp. 95 ff

34 See: Burke, Edmund III, op. Cit., P. 27

35 See Baer, ​​Gabriel, Fellah and Townsman in the Middle East, loc. Cit., Pp. 256/257 11

36 Since the wealthy classes could buy themselves out or, until the abolition of slavery, also provide a slave as a replacement, one can rightly speak of a peasant army. Service in the army, however, was initially a “privilege” of the Muslims. It was not until the middle of the 19th century that Copts began to be enlisted in the military.

37 See: Toldano, Ehud R., State and Society in mid-ninentenenth-century Egypt, Cambridge 1990, p. 185

38 See: Brown, Nathan, op. Cit., P. 73; Toledano, Ehud R., supra, p. 186; Richards, Alan, supra, p. 24

39 See: Schulze, Reinhard, Die Rebellion der Ägyptischen Fallahin, loc. Cit., P. 89 12

40 Cf. Schulze, Reinhard, Die Rebellion der ägyptischen Fellahin, loc. Cit., P. 86

41 Schulze, Reinhard, The rebellion of the Egyptian Fellahin, loc. Cit., P.82

42 See: Schulze, Reinhard, Die Rebellion der ägyptischen Fellahin, op. Cit., P. 84; On the economic structural features of the Upper Egyptian area and the importance of the trade and pilgrimage routes see: Lawson, Fred H., Rural Revolt and Provincial Society in Egypt, 1820-1824, in: IJMES 13/1981, pp. 131 ff

43 Cf. Schulze, Reinhard, Die Rebellion der ägyptischen Fellahin, loc. Cit., P. 82; Baer, ​​Gabriel, Studies in the Social History of modern Egypt, op cit, p. 96

44 Schulze, Reinhard, The rebellion of the Egyptian Fellahin, loc. Cit., P. 82

45 See Baer, ​​Gabriel, Studies in the Social History of modern Egypt, op. Cit., Pp. 96/97

46 Schulze, Reinhard, The rebellion of the Egyptian Fellahin, loc. Cit., P. 85

47 See: Baer, ​​Gabriel, Studies in the Social History of modern Egypt, op. Cit., Pp. 97/98; Richards, Alan, op. Cit., Pp. 22/23 In the literature used, there is broad consensus that the Upper Egyptian Mahdi movements were socially motivated revolts, which were mainly carried out by peasants. Only Lawson denies this: "... These revolts should instead be seen as revolts by village artisans and pieceworkers a- gainst the supervisors and merchants in whose hands the control of local sugar, wheat and cloth industries rested." Lawson, Fred H., loc. Cit., P. 145

48 Waterfield, Gordon (Ed.), Letters from Egypt (1862-1869) by Lady Duff Gordon, London 1969, p. 209

49 See: Schulze, Reinhard, Die Rebellion der ägyptischen Fellahin, loc. Cit., P. 87; Baer, ​​Gabriel, Studies in the Social History of modern Egypt, op. Cit., P. 95

50 Nathan Brown questions the relevance of these revolts, the manifestations of which were land occupations, attacks against large landowners, but also occasionally against Copts and Jews. In contrast, Ali Barakat argues, who puts them in the center of consideration in an essay and attaches great importance to them. See: Brown, Nathan, op. Cit., Pp. 177 ff; Barakat, Ali, al- fallahun, op. Cit., P. 213 ff also in: Barakat, Ali, tatauwur al- milkiya az- zira iya, op. Cit., P. 429 ff

51 See: Burke, Edmund III, loc. Cit., Pp. 32/33

52 Schulze, Reinhard, Die Rebellion der ägyptischen Fallahin, op. Cit., P. 91 Thomas Russel, who was commissioned as a police officer to combat these groups at the beginning of the 20th century, names several examples of brigand groups in his memoirs, such as one in group active in the province of Girga under the leadership of a man named Abd al-Ati, who is said to have been regarded as a bitter opponent of the rich landowning families in the area. Another group from the same province, led by a farmer from the village of Nag Hammadi and consisting of around 40 Fallahin, is said to have kidnapped large landowners in particular to extort ransom. See: Russel Pasha, Sir Thomas, op. Cit., Pp. 79/80; P. 80 ff

53 See: Barakat, Ali, al-milkiya az-zira iya, loc. Cit., Pp. 458/459

54 See: Brown, Nathan, op. Cit., Pp. 129 ff; Barakat, Ali, al-milkiya az-zira iya, op. Cit., Pp. 459/460

55 Russel Pasha, Sir Thomas, op. Cit., P. 33

56 See: Ruskay, John, op. Cit., Pp. 50/51; Schulze, Reinhard, the rebellion of the Egyptian Fellahin, op. Cit., P. 94 ff; Barakat, Ali, al-fallahun, op. Cit., P. 227

57 See: Schulze, Reinhard, die Rebellion der Ägyptischen Fellahin, op. Cit., P. 121 Schulze, Reinhard, Kolonisierung und Resistance, op. Cit., P. 38; Ruskay, John, supra, pp. 77 ff; Deeb, Marius, Party Politics in Egypt: The Wafd and its Rivals, 1919-1939, London 1973, p. 42

58 Cf. Schulze, Reinhard, die Rebellion der Ägyptischen Fellahin, loc. Cit., P. 113 ff: Tignor, Robert L., The Egyptian Revolution of 1919. New Directions in the Egyptian Economy, in: MES 12, 1976, p. 42 ff British contemporaries also report on the army's demands for food, transport animals and labor during the First World War. Symons wrote: "British, whether in civil or military command lost all sense of deceny ..." The impoverishment of the Fallahin during the war was mainly due to the inability of the British administration: "There was no intention to oppress ; yet there was oppression; there was no intention to be unjust; yet there was injustice ... “Symons, M. Travers, op. cit., p. 80; cf.: Russel Pasha, Sir Thomas, op. cit., pp. 190 ff;

59 See: Barakat, Ali, al-fallahun, op. Cit., Pp. 227/228

60 Schulze, Reinhard, Colonization and Resistance, op cit, p.38

61 See: Barakat, Ali, al-fallahun, op. Cit., P. 228

62 See: Schulze, Reinhard, Die Rebellion der Ägyptischen Fellahin, loc. Cit., P. 128

63 On Hizb al-Umma see: Ruskay, John, op. Cit., Pp. 57/58; On Hizb al-Watani see Deeb, Marius, Party Politics in Egypt, op. Cit., Pp. 80 ff; Ruskay, John, op. Cit., P. 59 ff

64 See: Deeb, Marius, Party Politics in Egypt, op. Cit., P. 39 ff, Schulze, Reinhard, Die Rebellion der ägyptischen Fellahin, op. Cit., P. 132/133

65 See: Ruskay, John, op. Cit., P. 90, p. 173 ff

66 "That explosion unavoidably had a nationalist dimension, but its class dimension was more crucial and more pronounced than of any previous upsurge of the Egyptian labor movement." Beinin, Joel, Lockmann, Zachary, Workers on the Nile. Nationalism, Communism, Islam and the Egyptian Working Class, 1882-1954, Princeton 1987, p. 110

67 On the role of the students see: Ruskay, John, op. Cit., Pp. 121/122, pp. 177 ff

68 On the revolts in the individual provincial cities see: ar-Rafi i, Abdarrahman, op. Cit., P.212ff; Schulze, Reinhard, The rebellion of the Egyptian Fellahin 1919, loc. Cit., P. 150 ff

69 See: ar-Rafi i, Abdarrahman, loc. Cit., I, p. 225

70 See: ar-Rafi i, Abdarrahman, op. Cit., I, p. 216

71 Compare: Schulze, Reinhard, Die Rebellion der Ägyptischen Fellahin, loc. Cit., Pp. 151/152

72 See Deeb, Marius, The 1919 Popular Uprising, loc. Cit., P. 106, p.115; Deeb, Marius, Party Politics in Egypt, op. Cit., Pp. 44/45; Schulze, Reinhard, The Rebellion of the Egyptian Fellahin, op. Cit., P. 156 ff

73 See: Schulze, Reinhard, Die Revolte der Ägyptischen Fellahin, loc. Cit., P. 161

74 See: Brown, Nathan, supra, p. 207; For example, the National Committee that founded the "Republic of Zifta" used the police forces under their authority against the Fallahin of the surrounding villages, which wanted to storm the Mudiriya and the city's prison to free prisoners. See: Schulze, Reinhard The rebellion of the Egyptian Fellahin, op. Cit., P. 159; Barakat, Ali, al-fallahun, op. Cit., P. 234

75 For example, Thomas Russel, who, despite his position as commander of the police in Cairo, regards the national cause of the Wafd with a certain sympathy, describes the Fallahin insurgents only as "murderous mobs" and their actions as "mad orgy of destruction". See: Russell Pasha, Sir Thomas, op. Cit., P. 194 and p. 199

76 Safran, Nadav, Egypt in Search of Political Community. An Analysis of the intellectual and political Evolution of Egypt, 1804-1952, Cambridge Mass. 1961, p. 101

77 Compare: Schulze, Reinhard, Die Rebellion der ägyptischen Fellahin, loc. Cit., P. 194;

78 See: Baer, ​​Gabriel, Fellah and Townsman in the Middle East, op. Cit., P. 264; Baer, ​​Gabriel, Studies in the Social History of Modern Egypt, op cit, p. 101; Deeb, Marius, Party Politics in Egypt, op. Cit., Pp. 42-44; Russel Pasha, Sir Thomas, op. Cit., Pp. 190/191; Symons, M. Travers, loc. Cit., P. 69 ff

79 See: ar-Rafi i, Abdarrahman, op. Cit., I, p. 192; Baer, ​​Gabriel, Fellah and Townsman in the Middle East, op cit, p. 305; Schulze, Reinhard, Colonization and Resistance, op. Cit., P. 43; Deeb, Marius, Party Politics in Egypt, loc. Cit., P. 44

80 The participation of women in the village resistance in the 19th century suggests that this was also the case during the revolts in 1919. In contrast to the participation of women in the rural uprising, about which nothing is known, the demonstrations by women in Cairo received a great deal of attention. These were probably only worn by members of the upper class, which can be concluded from the fact that at least one of these demonstrations was carried out with cars. See: ar-Rafi i, Abdarrahman, loc. Cit., I, pp. 175 ff, p. 208; Russel Pasha, Sir Thomas, op. Cit., Pp. 207 ff

81 See: Deeb, Marius, Party Politics in Egypt, op. Cit., P. 44; Brown, Nathan, supra, p. 209

82 See: Schulze, Reinhard, Die Rebellion der ägyptischen Fellahin, loc. Cit., P. 170 26

83 See: Barakat, Ali, al-fallahun, op. Cit., P. 229; ar- Rafi i, Abdarrahman, op. cit., p. 225

84 See: Schulze, Reinhard, Die Rebellion der ägyptischen Fellahin, loc. Cit., P. 173; Schulze bases his presentation primarily on files from the British Foreign Office. ar-Rafi i ignores this point in his otherwise very detailed presentation.

85 See: Schulze, Reinhard, Die Rebellion der ägyptischen Fellahin, op. Cit., Pp. 185 ff; Schulze does not provide any details on the involvement of the Coptic Fallahin in the revolts of 1919.

86 See: Schulze, Reinhard, Die Rebellion der ägyptischen Fellahin, op. Cit., P. 170