Was Martin Heidegger a stoic

Georg Hartmann Philosophy on the Way Karl Jaspers and Martin Heidegger in the 1920s I. The 1920s can hardly be overestimated in their formative importance for the thinking of Karl Jaspers and Martin Heidegger. During this time, Heidegger's work Being and Time was created, in which a new phenomenological and hermeneutic method was combined with an impulse that is noticeable not least in a sublime interpretation of conscience as "Dasein's call to itself". This impulse, which for Heidegger also resulted from his interpretation of Paul, which was directed towards the sense of execution of life, must not only be called ambiguous in terms of the philosophy of religion. Fifteen years earlier, Georg Simmel indicated in his essay "The Problem of the Religious Situation" a possible way out of the general crisis of belief in transcendent contents that he diagnosed: the problem of the religious situation would be solved if people lived a religious life lived, d. H. one that does not take place "with" religion, but whose implementation is itself a religious one - let alone that it takes place "out of" religion; H. only with regard to any object that stands outside of him.1 While such a life for Simmel could still take place against the background of a pantheistic harmony, as he found it in Goethe's work and person, for Heidegger and Jaspers it was each in its own way the reflection in antinomic borderline situations to the sting and litmus test of philosophical-existential self-reflection. That such a turn to the sense of enforcement with Heidegger could have an ambiguous potential did not go unnoticed even from the less karl jaspers and martin heidegger 67 denominational psychiatrist and psychologist Jaspers. He recorded the ambiguity he felt in an early note on Heidegger: The analysis of existence is limited to pure immanence. Death is the limit. But it is in fact transcended, especially with the idea of ​​apostasy. So: pure science and inalienable philosophy that awakens us, therefore it is possible that this atheistic science in the Thomistic sense could be used from another side (never by Heidegger himself) as a foundation for a theology of revelation.2 For Jaspers this is the time during which he merely slowly developed his own philosophizing in front of the audience of his lectures and lectures. Jaspers calls the years from 1923 to 1931 in his Philosophical Autobiography the "decade of deliberate public silence." 3 During this time, it was no coincidence that he reflected on the importance of "sinking" into one's own historicity for his thinking.4 It was also the time in which, as will be shown, he received an ambiguous impulse from Martin Heidegger's philosophizing, which is also still on the way. This phase is of particular interest, not least in that both philosophers, looking back on it and in view of contemporary confusions, tried above all to strictly differentiate their positions. The connection between the two therefore easily threatens to disappear beyond recognition behind the emphasized differences. In a letter to Paul Arthur Schilpp dated August 18, 1951 - on the occasion of the creation of the Philosophical Autobiography - Jaspers writes: My relationship with Heidegger: It is hardly touched at all in our writings. But the topic is obvious today and I would be interested in myself. On the one hand, I feel so different that we live in different worlds and can't even discuss things with one another, on the other hand, related to the traditional German professorial philosophy due to our mutual dependence on Kierkegaard and our common negative front position. But that's not really much in common.5 As early as the 1930s, probably around 1936, Martin Heidegger recorded the following about his relationship with Jaspers in his black books: georg hartmann68 Jaspers - probably the most extreme contrast to my only endeavor (the Question of being) could occur at the time. But because his and my "philosophy" are considered "existential philosophy", the most impressive evidence of the thoughtlessness of the age has been provided.6 So the diagnosis of a possible commonality between the two philosophers can actually only be traced back to a thoughtless reception and a superficial consideration ? Both did not publish any more comprehensive texts to determine their relationship to one another. Only posthumously did Hans Saner publish the chronologically compiled notes that Jaspers had written on Martin Heidegger over several decades. During his lifetime, Jaspers expressed himself most extensively in the fourth edition of his general psychopathology. This representation, as well as the one in his text on Bultmann's demythologization, referred above all to the fundamental differences that have long been known. In the Heidegger chapter of his Philosophical Autobiography, Jaspers referred to the time during the Second World War, in which he occasionally dealt directly with Heidegger, in contrast to defining the manner in which he referred to him during the 1920s as rather vague However, an indefinite bond with Heidegger is already reflected in her letters at the time, rather than a time of mutual conversations and arguments.8 It is therefore not easy to think that Heidegger's philosophizing could in fact only have played such an indefinite role in the development of philosophy. On the contrary, some indications can be found that Jaspers himself assessed the possible influence of Heidegger's thought on the emergence of his philosophy as low only in retrospect.9 And should there have been similarities, Hans Saner later suspected that these had no real depth 10 The first meeting between Jaspers and Heidegger took place in the spring of 1920 in Heidelberg. They did not meet in Freiburg until April of the following year, as a letter to sister Erna indicates: Gertrud and I were in Freiburg for three days. I was tired from work, had to argue again and see something else. We lived at the Munster, enjoyed it, and I spoke to the philosophers there. There is a very young person who I like and find serious, named Heidegger.11 karl jaspers and martin heidegger 69 Between these two visits, in June 1920, the sociologist Max Weber died in Munich. If Heidegger's possible impulse for Jaspers is to be pursued, the earlier strong influence of Jaspers' through the person and the work of Max Weber must be taken into account. The lifelong connection between Jaspers and thinking and Weber's personality, which is seen as an ideal, can of course only be briefly indicated here. In Max Weber, Jaspers thought he saw the meaning of a philosophical existence embodied and exemplified, which was not specifically developed.12 For the method of separating knowledge and values ​​as well as the formation of ideal types, which was essentially used in the psychology of world views in 1919, Jaspers had expressly relied on him 13 Immediately after the death of Jaspers' only contemporary philosopher at the time, a second relationship that was no less formative for Jaspers began to develop: the intensive philosophical exchange with his brother-in-law, the Berlin doctor Ernst Mayer. In the 1920s, the two sent each other to a large extent texts and chapters of nascent philosophy for mutual criticism. On September 30, 1927, Jaspers expressed Mayer's importance for his work also in a comparative view of Heidegger: It is a miracle to me that you can tell me such detailed and factually relevant things at this time when everyone philosophers into the absolute Loneliness is pushed. What Heidegger says is also little, because it is not as open and central as what you notice. With method, form, principle, - you, Heidegger is always directly with the essential.14 II. By pointing out that Heidegger, in contrast to Mayer, is primarily concerned with method, form and principle, Jaspers gives the main aim of Heidegger's criticism in his comments on Karl Jaspers' "Psychology of World Views" (1919/21) again. However, behind this opposition between form, method and principle on the one hand and the actual, the content on the other hand, a question mark can now also be put. The fact that an underlying content is able to reveal itself through a particular method ultimately becomes for Jaspers himself an essential understanding of the meaning of philosophizing and a constant challenge to shed light on this content. georg hartmann70 That in the book Jaspers orientated himself methodologically to Max Weber and at the same time also a way of philosophizing that was not expressly conscious of himself, i. H. of unconditional judgment was a central aspect of the notes. At first Heidegger seemed undecided whether his criticism, which wanted to measure the work against a philosophical intention implied by the author himself but remained hidden, might not be wrong.15 He even wondered whether this work was not "fundamentally unphilosophical" .16 Nevertheless, Heidegger finally believed he recognized a philosophical impulse behind the psychological backdrop in the work, which the author was quite deliberately not dominated by a philosophical method - even if it could become a stimulus for the development of his own thinking . This kind of tentative exposure of a subliminally effective motivation, which Heidegger undertook with his criticism of the psychology of world views, will be pursued by Jaspers himself in the future. Just as Jaspers endeavored to bring to light the actual but hidden content of philosophical existence with a view to Max Weber, so Heidegger rendered him a comparable service, which, however, increasingly aroused resistance in Jaspers. In fact, with his comments, Heidegger had dared to criticize the methodical understanding of Dasein or existence, which in his opinion remained unclear, which was just as courageous as his own search. On August 1, 1921, Jaspers confirmed by letter that he had read the review: of all I read, M. E. is the one who digs deepest into the roots of the thoughts. That's why she really touched me inside. However, I still miss the positive method - also in the discussions about "I am" and "historical". Despite all the noticeable "potency to get ahead" he was disappointed again and again: Heidegger had not got any further than himself. - Perhaps, one might say, not further in the Jaspers' sense, but in a different direction. Looking back, on a sheet of paper attached to his copy of Heidegger's comments, Jaspers documented a fundamental reservation that made itself felt from the beginning, which led to his not being further involved in the criticism, as it was going in a completely different direction to him the one he was looking for seemed to go.17 Now, not least in the appendix to the comments karl jaspers and martin heidegger 71, Heidegger made it very clear that he had in mind another way of anticipating existence. That is why he quickly proposed a different structure for the psychology of world views. The urge for a sharper philosophical explication initially led to the advice to simply omit the introduction - at least the part in which Jaspers tried to systematically outline his position. In addition, Heidegger suggested moving the third chapter - "The Spiritual Types" - to the beginning or, even better, to the middle. It should be made clear that attitudes and worldviews arise from the experience of borderline situations, rather than just being found in a housing. After all, Jaspers himself pointed out that attitudes and worldviews emerged as emanations from living forces.18 Towards the end of his remarks, Heidegger sums up the criticism of Jaspers: the attitude of mere contemplation does not give what it wants to give, »the possibility of a radical one Review and decide «. There is also a lack of strict awareness of the need for methodical questions. The self-reflection sought by Jaspers, the intention to awaken this self-reflection in the other, which Heidegger evidently sensed to some extent, can only succeed "if the other is ruthlessly driven into reflection in a certain way." The aim of this reflection is to create an awareness "that the attribution of objects to philosophy is tied to strict methodological execution". Heidegger clearly distinguishes this rigor of methodological execution from the rigor of scientific knowledge, for which only "the requirement of objectivity" is decisive. When it comes to actual philosophizing, the philosophizing person with all his historical limitations is essentially involved.19 III. In retrospect, Jaspers spoke in his Philosophical Autobiography that at that time the connection with Heidegger's thinking aimed at isolation was only "somehow" given. That this connection was very important to him, even if not immediately transparent, is testified not least by three unprinted, differently executed drafts of thanks for the foreword of his three-volume philosophy, which could be found in the estate. The shortest of the three formulations seems rather inconspicuous, but probably astonished the reader at the time, especially by naming Martin Heidegger together with Ernst Mayer: I have to thank Ernst Mayer and Martin Heidegger for their direct relationship to my work.20 In addition, I have to thank Ernst Mayer and Martin Heidegger Another typescript draft: Martin Heidegger21 I owe a criticism of my »Psychology of Weltanschauungen«. He placed the accent in such a way that I was more determined to stick to the path of going on. His own thinking22 encouraged me by the fact that the specialist philosophized when questioning existence.23 With this formulation, Jaspers now emphasizes the importance of Heidegger, especially his criticism of the psychology of world views, for the clearer orientation of his own path towards philosophy and last but not least, the common direction of philosophizing with regard to existence - without alluding to possible differences. The third and most detailed variant, on the other hand, turns out to be much richer and more exciting: I have only ever been able to read Heidegger's work "Being and Time" in parts and only fleetingly. I stand with respect for the dark determination that is expressed in it; I can affirm it, but not partake in it.25 I admire the energy of persistent thinking and my own speaking, but I lose my breath when I give myself up to it26 . Among the27 contemporaries who philosophize in a professional sense, he is the one to whom my heart is actually28 open and whose course I follow with expectation. In the guise of a school-like and scientific approach, an origin speaks which, whatever may come from him, affects us.29 It is obviously not mentioned here that Jaspers saw Heidegger's thinking only as a countervailing power to his own thinking from the start which he could at once have rejected as a form of unphilosophy that he could clearly grasp. The situation is more complex: the real problem, from which the question of the nature and possibility of a fundamental philosophical criticism could arise, as posed by the Heidegger chapter written in 1953 for the Philosophical Autobiography, lay in the serious karl jaspers and martin heidegger 73 Equal origin of affirmation and non-participation. It would be a different case if Jaspers could have simply discarded the other origin. However, the fact that he feels addressed by a thinking, even thinks he can affirm it, even if he cannot participate in it, raises the question of the significance of the philosophical criticism to be exercised by Jaspers. If the criticism were only about the external form of the school-like, scholastic presentation of this thinking, then the affirmation would still be preserved and the tension that permeates the critical appraisal of Heidegger by Jaspers would basically be defused. In particular after 1945, however, the even more urgent task of clarifying his relationship to Heidegger's philosophizing arose for Jaspers. The tense finding of the most detailed acknowledgment still shows the potential of an open discussion, which, not least, should have allowed a fundamentally critical inquiry into one's own thinking.At least this is how Jaspers finally formulated his question about the nature and possibility of an actual philosophical, i.e. H. Criticism that tries to penetrate the origins. The fact that he emphasized that this question had not yet been resolutely addressed by him suggests that he did not believe he had dealt with it exhaustively with his extensive remarks on the "loving struggle" in the second volume of philosophy. Shortly before the philosophy went to press, Jaspers wrote to Ernst Mayer in a letter discussing whether he should thank Heidegger in the foreword for his contribution to the creation of this work. In a letter to Mayer dated September 23, 1931, a few days before his manuscript was sent to Springer, he wrote: My plan is: Heidegger will be deleted. What it said there is true, and so it could stand still. But I believe, like you, that Heidegger is just angry. I intend, hopefully in the course of the next year, to write a Heidegger review. In it I can express what he meant to me. Because of the relationships between the existential philosophy of Heidegger and myself, I have to accept that the experts, especially since the Heidegger people complain that I don't name him and even accuse myself of plagiarism, that would be stupid as well. To quote Heidegger in the text would be untrue given the style of my book. Then the preface would be better. How do you think after thinking again? 30 georg hartmann74 The deletion remained. The fact that Jaspers, in a note on Heidegger (No. 172) from the period between 1961 and 1964, finally referred to the general description from Heidegger's contribution to Ernst Jünger's "About› The Line "" after initial hesitation, seems to suggest, that he still felt that "indefinite" bond with Heidegger was not sufficiently clarified in the room.31 There was talk of an ultimately restorative thinking about metaphysical questions that believed to be in bright rooms, and whose representatives had to ask "where he came from." for the light has taken to a clearer vision'.32 It is known from a letter from Jaspers of December 24, 1931 that Jaspers considered the possibility of mutual criticism.33 Jaspers suggested that both should carry out such a criticism in the form of a letter in January 1950 again in a letter to Heidegger.34 However, this project dates back to the 1950s just as little has become as it did in the 1930s. The further intention to write "only" a monograph of Hei degger's criticism at that time is documented in a sheet in the estate which, according to Jaspers' subsequent dating, dates from around 1931. On this sheet, among other book projects, he also mentioned a “Heidegger Critique” with the subtitle “Existential Philosophy and Phenomenology.” 35 Now there is actually no direct, proven Heidegger quotation in philosophy, but Jaspers decided to put a footnote similar as Heidegger had referred to the psychology of world views in two places in Sein und Zeit. He placed them in the section on the immediate totality of existence in the sub-volume on Philosophical World Orientation.36 In the footnote itself, Jaspers only gives brief indications of the points at which thinking in being and time seemed essential to him: Heidegger said about "Being in the world as well as about existence and historicity [...] said essentials «. At the end of this section, Jaspers set himself apart from the orientation for which Heidegger's work stood for him only in a slightly cryptic manner: that where we transcend existence, in which we become conscious of it, is not, however, existence itself as a more comprehensive existence, the more radical to be won, but either the idea of ​​an overarching world of objective reality or the self-being of existence or the actual being of transcendence. The immediate whole of existence is not the origin and not the final goal, but a place where we take an upswing in these three directions, indefinitely where.37 karl jaspers and martin heidegger 75 Against the rejected orientation of Heidegger, Jaspers programmatically set his own shape, the philosophy its shape bestowing tripartite mode of transcending. IV. Heidegger's philosophical impulse nevertheless bore fruit with Jaspers. Along various manuscripts by Jaspers from this period, some stations on the path that emerged for him in the course of the independent appropriation of Heidegger's emphatic reference to the historicity of philosophizing can be sketched. A comprehensive evaluation of the numerous lecture manuscripts and notes from that period to be found scattered in the estate, which have so far hardly been transcribed, cannot be carried out here. Nevertheless, an attempt should be made to document essential traces using a few examples. A letter to Ernst Mayer on December 22, 1921 reports on upcoming work on a philosophical system, after Jaspers had spoken about a year and a half earlier about the project of a general psychology: There is something rushed about my work. I often think and write down for the summer lecture in order to have time for the eventual trip to Sicily. But actually the philosophical system is more and more essential to me. I won't be able to publish anything for a long time. Because this task is difficult, the hardest and the easiest to be completely beaten up. My lectures are indirect ways there.38 In a note on his seminar "Exercises on Hegel's Logic" from the winter semester 1922/23, Jaspers stated in which he wanted to see the essential importance of a discussion, especially with Hegel's philosophy, but also with philosophy in general .39 As a motto, as it were, Jaspers noted: "Through Hegel into Philosophy". For him, this means that one should "get to the origins, assumptions". Jaspers further states: “Wanting the 'impossible'. A new point of view: all 'problems', insofar as they are individual and solvable, are only expressions and means: the piano [,] on which the philosopher plays. […] We cannot be interested in individual problems philosophically as individuals. «In contrast to the individual sciences, philosophizing is not only concerned with the individual steps and parts of thinking, but is directed at georg hartmann76 as a whole. He wants to use the "examination through inner intuition" to counter the danger of endless philosophizing, especially when dealing with a philosopher like Hegel, in which concepts are merely shifted back and forth. The question is how a gathering anticipation should be made. Examination through inner intuition, in a modified continuation of his phenomenological approach from earlier days, now means that it is a matter of questioning existence. - One may add: both your own and that of other thinkers. It does not depend on the most closed possible connection of thinking. "You philosophize everywhere or not at all." As long as philosophy is held to be learnable content, you miss the philosophical impetus of these thoughts and ultimately never come to philosophy yourself. For Jaspers it follows that all problem-solving means »finding ways to the ultimate approach, to the absolute question, to grasp a whole.« Getting to know such figures aims at »[possible] possible solutions: d. H. possible wholes, verified in existences. "And he sums up the train of thought:" Philosophize: go to the source40 of our existence, think and make it conscious - with a special function of thinking: dizzying - without perfection, as a rational, purely rational thought . «It now looks as if Jaspers is at least a few steps closer to Heidegger's advice to develop world views out of existence. The demonstration of the shapes of wholes should now be related more clearly to the reason for existence. Jaspers thinks of a verification of these wholes through existences - but not of the development of a wholeness based on the possibility of one's own existence. It seems that he still adheres to his approach of an observer perspective and thus to the framework of an understanding psychology. With the idea of ​​verifying those wholes through existences, Jaspers expresses both the approach and the remaining distance to Heidegger's critical impulse. That Jaspers did not stop at an understanding of philosophizing that is still very close to the psychology of world views is shown in a programmatic note from 1924: “Philosophy cannot be pursued like the investigation of an object that is independent of me. We stand in philosophy in it, create it with our life. Life as thinking and thinking as life. «This life - Jaspers continues - is not a being, not a legal process. It follows from this that it has no genesis that can be seen as necessary. Since life can at no time be regarded as finished and karl jaspers and martin heidegger 77 closed, philosophy should never be allowed to round off into a whole. For the practical side of philosophy, this has the consequence that an "eternal conduct of life" as for example with the Stoics is excluded. Instead, it would be all about choice, freedom and historical awareness. This historical consciousness, which emerges from free choice, ultimately signifies an unknowable, but nevertheless freely definable necessity. This free but unknowable necessity should not be held down as the ground that no one else can lay down. Instead of a primarily attempted attitude to observe the world, there is the insight: “We are in the world, we are with it, we are never confronted with it. What stands in opposition is not the world. «For the way of philosophizing it follows that in it readiness, openness, creation and realization come first. The character of the path is particularly emphasized: the striving to become clear that it is about explication (later called enlightenment). For him, however, it also remains that only relative ideals can be set in this way. Jaspers seems to have developed his thinking further in the direction of Heidegger's critical impulse. In addition, standing in the world is now also standing in communication for him. If one can speak of an absolute concrete in the center of life, then it does not concern anything known being, but is based on what has been decided, what has been chosen, what cannot be undone, i.e. H. the sense of the unconditional act. This inner wholeness can only be recognized to the outside and from the outside in a finite way - therein lies the permanent possibility of a deception, towards the others as well as towards oneself. Therefore, it is necessary to repeat the examination as to whether the inner unconditional action is possible purely, in genuineness. This authenticity cannot be recognized in the sense of something generally valid - it can only be called into question again and again in the ongoing process of communication. Unconditional action is therefore linked to the ideally required openness of communication. In the context of the lecture on philosophical systematics in the summer semester of 1925, there is another condensed reference to the increasing modification of the approach expressly practiced by Jaspers: the absolute consciousness, which for him was one with consciousness in general up to the psychology of world views and for a while beyond , has meanwhile proven to be "only accessible through binding existence in him and in fighting communication - in love or the will to destroy - not in mere observation." Jaspers now expressly admits that man, even if he has psychology and logic drives, stands "in an ideological commitment and a content". "From there, his work gains momentum - and lives in the tension between the punctual objectivity of seeing from the outside and the struggling appropriation and annihilation from one's own commitment." 41 At the same time, however, a position has also been reached that gives impulse Heideggers translates it into a permanent pendulum movement without dialectical closure. For the Heidegger von Sein und Zeit, the intention of realizing one's own historicity in tension with that "always striving for punctual objectivity" could only appear as a misunderstanding of the existential basic situation and the actual possible space of existence. If Heidegger tried to give the historicity of existence its meaning in a decisive and inferential anticipation aimed at the wholeness of existence, Jaspers, on the other hand, appropriated the reference to historicity in such a way that an anticipation was demanded from it, which is only reflected in one can realize a movement of transcending open to all sides. It can therefore be assumed that Jaspers took up the impulse given to him by Heidegger to delve into his own historicity, that he let himself be addressed by him. This shows the meaning of the affirmation in the deleted thanksgiving that the preface to philosophy was supposed to bring. Now for Jaspers this historicity means at the same time a commitment to a program of incessant examination and mutual illumination, if you will: in hearing a call of conscience, an unconditional demand, the origin of which lies beyond the unity of existence in permanent withdrawnness, i.e. H. Transcendence remains localized. At the same time, there is a need for the sensual appearance of this actual authority in the forms of historical authority, which always remain questionable, and the confrontation with authority must always take place through communication. Just as transcendence cannot be grasped directly, it must not be unduly captured in all its historical forms. From this, in turn, the other aspect of thanksgiving appears understandable: that he could not take part in Heidegger's philosophizing. I. E. Last but not least: He cannot philosophize with Heidegger in the way that was essential for the development of philosophy, especially with Ernst Mayer, but also with his wife Gertrud. From the simultaneity of the affirmation of a thought and the inability to be able to take part in it, the tension arises, which drives to continued illumination. karl jaspers and martin heidegger 79 V. Starting from this point, the root of that question, already mentioned several times, can be sketched, which Jaspers tried to sketch in the context of his philosophical autobiography, "the question of the meaningful discussion in philosophizing, which, it seems to me, to this day it has not been clarified, let alone answered. «42 This question, which was particularly bothering him against the background of the posthumous chapter on Martin Heidegger, aimed at the possibility and nature of an actual philosophical criticism. Not least on the advice of his wife Gertrud and a few friends, he decided not to publish it during his lifetime.43 When Jaspers was asked to give an opinion on Heidegger at the end of 1945, he accepted the task that was precarious for him and finally cast the vote on influence of the thinker he judged to be dangerous in his pedagogical effect on the student youth by the failure of a chair. Jaspers did not want to give up his own educational expectation that Heidegger would question his thinking and his previous effectiveness. But also for his own thinking, looking at Heidegger, his work and political activity, Jaspers had a particular need, which ultimately made his question about the possibility and nature of an actual philosophical criticism even more urgent. The question was rooted in contradicting movements, the affirmation of a thought and at the same time the strict rejection of a figure it saw as a decided opponent. For his Philosophical Autobiography it was therefore obvious to devote a chapter to Martin Heidegger and, with a systematic intention, at the same time to the question of the possibility and nature of an actual philosophical criticism. Pointed to the essentials, the following result emerges for Jaspers: When attempting the philosophical criticism that penetrates the origins, where such criticism seems to reach the limit of the almost compellingly convincing (which it can never reach), an objection is possible, which cancels the entire critical attempt at one stroke. This objection applies primarily only to a contemporary and concerns the alleged impossibility of “asking the enemy to jump over his own shadow, to expect him to have an insight that would paralyze his peculiar productivity. Goethe georg hartmann80 once said that what is against the conditions of one's own existence should not be admitted. ”This reached a point that is crucial from the point of view of Jaspersian philosophizing, insofar as he is concerned with illuminating one's own and the possible existence of the other goes. What should the meaning of critical discussion be seen in? In the end, because it doesn't seem possible any other way, in clarifying, strengthening and ultimately defending your own position against all possible objections? Jaspers now points in a different direction: Against such an objection one would have to say: It is the most wonderful thing about philosophizing that such an objection [does not] apply here and only here. Because the philosophizing person desires every possible insight. For him, the mind and its productivity is only a tool, not an end in itself. He will always experience that this tool works the better the more decisively he is gripped by the impulse of truth. That is why philosophers seek extreme criticism.45 For Jaspers, it can be summarized, in the 1920s, under the influence of Heidegger, a further development of his originally primarily psychological approach in consciousness resulted in a position that no longer in itself Above all, it is able to make use of a freely floating consciousness in order to illuminate the own situation of the person and the thinker - where in fact this had not happened at all. In doing so, however, he did not simultaneously give up any sense of an external perspective, as seemed to be the case for Heidegger in Being and Time with his intention to take human temporality and historicity seriously as unconditional finitude. Despite the impulse received from Heidegger, which referred him to the path of philosophizing in an unconditional relationship to a historical existence and which he absorbed in his own way, Jaspers remained true to his earlier formation in the spirit of Max Weber and thus connected in a different way to that attitude, which found its methodically practiced expression in the psychology of world views. In the end, historicity retained an openness for him that is not finally closed by any border situation. With Jaspers, rooting in existence is accompanied by a universal space of reason common to all people, more precisely: by the request to first develop such a space, which in the 1950s and 1960s should also include the so-called philosophical basic knowledge. Neither this basic knowledge nor the partially illuminated existence should, however, be regarded as a conclusive knowledge of beings, let alone as knowledge of being. karl jaspers and martin heidegger 81 Among the preparatory work for the book On Independent Thinking. Hannah Arendt and her critics, whose systematic question Jaspers was preoccupied with long before 1964 and to which he continued to adhere even after giving up the exemplary adaptation to the case of Hannah Arendt and her Eichmann book, 46 there is a note that can then be read : "Those who want to think independently get into a turmoil with themselves, from which they cannot get out of the time." 47 Ultimately, for Jaspers, there remains the tension between the two poles of historical and existential roots on the one hand and the opening to a common, On the other hand, the reality of reason that has yet to be produced is the goal of commonality, mediated by the striving for independence in thinking, which can still be directed against one's own original ties. The text is based on a lecture that was given as part of the conference "Jaspers and Heidegger in the Philosophy of the 20th Century" from September 28 to 29, 2017 at the Heidelberg Academy of Sciences. Notes 1 Georg Simmel: "The problem of the religious situation", in: ders .: Hauptprobleme der Philosophie. Philosophical Culture (Complete Edition Vol. 14), Frankfurt a. M. 1996, p. 381. First published in: Georg Simmel: Philosophische Kultur. Collected essays, Leipzig 1911. 2 Karl Jaspers: Notes on Martin Heidegger, Munich 1989, p. 37 (note no. 9). 3 Karl Jaspers: Philosophical Autobiography, expanded new edition, Munich 1977, p. 47. 4 For the concept of depression, see in particular: Karl Jaspers: Philosophy II. 41973, pp. 218 f. 5 Karl Jaspers: Selected publishing and translator correspondence, ed. by Dirk F onfara, (KJG III / 8.1), Basel 2018, p. 597. 6 Martin Heidegger: Considerations II-VI (Black Hefts 1931-1938), (GA 94), Frankfurt a. M. 2014, p. 399. The quote can be found in Reflections V, written down around 1936. 7 Cf. Jaspers (note 3), p. 105. 8 Cf. on this very differentiated: Bernd Weidmann: »› Liebender Kampf 'and' German University '. The failed friendship between Karl Jaspers and Martin Heidegger «, in: Thomas Jung / Stefan Müller-Doohm (eds.): Prekäre Freundschaften. About spiritual closeness and distance, Munich 2011, pp. 121-143. 9 The handwritten sheet added by Jaspers to his copy of Heidegger's notes, which was reported by Saner in: Martin Heidegger / Karl Jaspers: Briefwechsel 1920-1963, ed. by Walter Biemel and Hans Saner, Frankfurt a. M. 1990, p. 224 f. Georg hartmann82 10 See Hans Saner: »› This one was my polite enemy ‹. Aspects of Jaspers ’Heidegger Critique«, in: ders .: Loneliness and Communication. Essays on the history of thinking, Basel 1994, pp. 218 f. 11 Karl Jaspers to Erna Dugend, April 10, 1921, DLA Marbach, A: Jaspers. 12 Cf. the letter from Karl Jaspers to his parents Henriette and Karl Jaspers senior, June 16, 1920, printed in: Suzanne Kirkbright: Karl Jaspers. A biography. Navigation in Truth, New Haven / London 2004, p. 254. 13 Cf. Karl Jaspers: Psychologie der Weltanschauungen, Berlin 1919, p. 14: »The separation of ideological evaluation and scientific consideration, for which he [Max Weber, GH] according to earlier formulations only brought the pathos, should also be striven for in the present experiment. «14 Karl Jaspers to Ernst Mayer, September 30, 1927, DLA Marbach, A: Jaspers. 15 See Martin Heidegger to Heinrich Rickert, August 27, 1920, printed in: Martin Heidegger / Heinrich Rickert: Briefe 1912 to 1933 and other documents, ed. by Alfred Denker, Frankfurt a. M. 2002, p. 51. 16 See Martin Heidegger to Karl Löwith, March 23, 1920, printed in: Martin Heidegger / Karl Löwith: Briefwechsel 1919-1973, ed. by Alfred Denker, Freiburg 2017, p. 17. 17 Cf. on this: Heidegger / Jaspers (note 9), p. 22 f. 18 Martin Heidegger: “Comments on Karl Jaspers'› Psychology of Weltanschauungen ‹(1919/21) «, In: ders .: Wegmarken, (GA 9), Frankfurt a. M. 21978, p. 44. First publication in: Karl Jaspers in discussion, ed. by Hans Saner, Munich 1973, pp. 70-100. 19 Ibid., P. 42. 20 Originally it said: "I have two men to thank publicly for their direct relationship to my work." The above sentence is the result of a handwritten correction. 1 sheet on the back from the bundle "Historical change of German national consciousness", DLA Marbach, A: Jaspers, folder 03.070, 4.2. 21 Deleted: "Professor of Philosophy in Freiburg". 22 Deleted: "became encouraging for". 23 1 sheet reverse side carbon copy with handwritten corrections paged 5 from: Bundle »Politics / Anschauung des Politischen«, DLA Marbach, A: Jaspers, folder 03.101, 1.1. 24 Inserted: »each«. 25 Two other variants deleted: "but I have no part in it / cannot participate in it." 26 Deleted: »a moment«. 27 Deleted: »philosophical«. 28 Replaces two illegible words: "actually". 29 1 sheet from the bundle »Foreword Notes on Philosophy 1930«, DLA Marbach, A: Jaspers, from portfolio 06.144. 30 Typescript letter from Karl Jaspers to Ernst Mayer, September 23, 1931, DLA Marbach, A: Jaspers. 31 In an earlier note (No. 109) Jaspers asked whether Heidegger was referring to him. See Jaspers (note 2), pp. 134 and 192 f. 32 The contribution to the celebratory publication was first printed as a letter from Heidegger to Ernst Jünger with the title »About› The Line ‹« in: Freundliche Treffen. Festschrift for Ernst Jünger on his 60th birthday, ed. by Armin Mohler, Frankfurt a. M. 1955, the quotation on p. 37. A separate reprint with a different title followed a year later: Martin Heidegger: Zur Seinsfrage, Frankfurt a. M. 1956, here the quote on p. 36. 33 Cf. also: Jaspers (note 2), p. 12 (Hans Saner: "Foreword"). 34 Cf. on this: Ibid., Pp. 18 f. (Hans Saner: "Foreword"). karl jaspers and martin heidegger 83 35 The sheet is in "Notes on Philosophy I / 2", DLA Marbach, A: Jaspers, folder 06.138, 3.2. 36 Karl Jaspers: Philosophy I. Philosophical World Orientation, Berlin and others. 41973, p. 66. 37 Ibid., P. 67. 38 Handwritten letter from Karl Jaspers to Ernst Mayer, December 22, 1921, DLA Marbach, A: Jaspers. 39 5 sheets handwritten from: Bundle “Introduction to the Study of Philosophy” (Notes dated “Winter 1922/1923”, for the seminar: Exercises on Hegel's Logic. Jaspers held the lecture “Logic and Philosophical Systematics” at the same time), DLA Marbach, A : Jaspers, Folder 06.138, 3.2 40 Other possible reading: »Sources«. 41 1 sheet with handwritten pagination 93 from: Lecture Philosophical Systematics summer semester 1925 (with parts from lecture summer semester 1921), from the bundle "Philosophy / disposition for further elaboration and notes", DLA Marbach, A: Jaspers. 42 Jaspers (note 3), p. 106. 43 Cf. on this the letters from Lotte Walz (undated) and Robert Oboussier of September 24, 1953 to Karl Jaspers, which he placed in the withheld Heidegger chapter. Both advised against the publication. DLA Marbach, A: Jaspers. 44 The factually missing »not« in the printed text can be found in the postponed typescript of the text, DLA Marbach, A: Jaspers. 45 Jaspers (note 3), p. 110. 46 After Jaspers had reached an agreement with her shortly before, on the occasion of Arendt's visit to Basel, that he would no longer write the book about her after all, he informed his sister Erna Dugend in a letter dated 18 October 10, 1966 with: "If I have the manuscript [answer. To criticize my work Wohin der Bundes Republik ?, GH], I want to write a little book: ›On Independent Thinking‹ - then I'll be back to philosophy. It could make a basic motif of my intellectual existence clear from school and in the end it could be a kind of “balance sheet”. Larger parts of it have occasionally been written down by me. «DLA Marbach, A: Jaspers. 47 1 sheet handwritten from the bundle “Part I On Independent Thinking 1, Consequences of the Will to Independent Thinking”, DLA Marbach, A: Jaspers, from folder 04.018, 13.