Are Chechen ethnic Russians

Decisive authority


1.1. The appellant entered the federal territory illegally on April 30, 2004 and applied for asylum on the same day. He stated that he was a citizen of the Russian Federation.

On May 7, 2004 and June 23, 2004 he was questioned in writing by the Federal Asylum Office (initial reception center in Traiskirchen and Innsbruck branch) with the help of two interpreters for the Russian language. In a nutshell, he stated that he was a Muslim and belonging to the Chechen ethnic group. His family lived in G. in Chechnya and moved away for five months during the First Chechen War. At midnight. In 1996 she returned to G., the appellant ran ahead and opened the apartment door. There was an explosion - possibly a mine - in which he suffered serious injuries to his face. Because of this disfigurement, he was constantly harassed and mistreated by Russian soldiers and police officers, who believed him to be a resistance fighter.

1.2.1. With the contested decision, the Federal Asylum Office rejected the asylum application in accordance with § 7 AsylG as amended by Federal Law Gazette I 101/2003 (point I); in accordance with Section 8 (1) AsylG, it declared that the rejection, deportation or deportation of the applicant to the Russian Federation was permissible (point II of the ruling); In accordance with Section 8 (2) AsylG, it expelled the applicant from Austria (point III).

The Federal Asylum Agency made extensive findings on the situation in Chechnya, including. means: "The basic concept of this federation law consisted in the creation of a registration system at the current place of residence [...] or at the place of residence [...] at which the citizens report their place of residence to the local departments of the Ministry of the Interior Registration can be sued in court and there are various aid organizations that provide legal assistance in all republics for such procedures.

In the absence of any political commitment to the Chechen rebels and in the absence of verifiable evidence of (threatening) targeted individual persecution by Russian state organs against the individual for this reason, there is regularly a domestic escape alternative in other parts of the Russian Federation, including for ethnic Chechens . Possible practical difficulties with registration can usually be overcome. In view of the large extent of the Russian Federation, it is forbidden to generalize known immigration restrictions in individual cases. There is no permanent danger of existence-threatening impoverishment ...

There is no reliable knowledge as to whether Chechen people are exposed to repression after their return to Russia. In the case of deported persons who have been involved in the Chechnya issue, it can be assumed that these persons will receive special attention from the Russian authorities. ... According to the human rights organization Memorial, repatriated Chechens can legally settle in the Russian Federation. "

The Federal Asylum Office did not consider the applicant's submissions to be credible. It also assumes that the appellant's fears are "merely assumptions, that is, just subjectively felt fear", which he was unable to substantiate with "indications of persecution specifically directed or planned against him". The bad situation in his home country is not suitable to make a well-founded fear of persecution within the meaning of the Convention on the Legal Status of Refugees, Federal Law Gazette 55/1955 (Geneva Refugee Convention, hereinafter: GFK) credible, because everyone there is exposed to the negative consequences of such conditions living residents are exposed. The general political and social conditions in the home country of an applicant do not in themselves justify the granting of asylum. Since the beginning of the Second Chechen War, thousands of ethnic Chechens have relocated to areas outside the Caucasus region and have lived there safely, since there is freedom of establishment in the Russian Federation, registration at the place of residence and residence is only a notification and not a permit, and none for the whole If there is nationwide group persecution of ethnic Chechens in relation to the territory of the Russian Federation, the appellant has no reason to fear persecution in territories of the Russian Federation outside of Chechnya. The Federal Asylum Office referred to a decision of the Lower Saxony Higher Administrative Court (OVG) - that is the OVG Lüneburg - of July 3, 2003, which, on the basis of the (at that time) most recent ad hoc report of the German Foreign Office, assumed that Chechens could "join the Settle down on the territory of the Russian Federation and find a livelihood there, albeit a modest one ". The applicant is therefore "regardless of the absence of state persecution or threat of persecution, a reasonable,‘ domestic escape alternative ’open".

The Federal Asylum Office also assumed that the applicant was not at risk or threatened within the meaning of Section 8 (1) AsylG in conjunction with Section 57 (1) and (2) FrG, and finally justified its deportation decision in accordance with Section 8 (2) AsylG.

This decision was sent personally to the applicant on 9.9.2004.

1.2.2. This timely appeal is directed against this decision. The appellant reiterated his facts from the interrogations and, by quoting the reports of several non-governmental organizations, challenged the assumption that he was entitled to a domestic escape alternative in the Russian Federation.

1.3. On April 18, 2005, the appellate authority held a public hearing in which only the appellant participated as a party and an interpreter for the Chechen language was called in. The Federal Asylum Agency decided not to participate. The hearing was necessary because the appeal pointed to new evidence, because the appellate authority also intended to introduce new documents on the situation in Chechnya and the situation of the Chechens in the Russian Federation into the proceedings, and because the evidence of the contested decision is inconclusive.

1.4. The appeal authority raised evidence by interrogating the appellant during the appeal hearing and - in addition to the files of the first-instance proceedings - looking at the following documents, which were also discussed in the appeal hearing:

Constitution of the Russian Federation of December 12, 1993 ( Constitution of the Chechnya Republic (Chechnya - Constitution) of 2003

( United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Paper on Asylum Seekers from the Russian Federation in the context of the situation in Chechnya, February 2003 Human Rights Center "Memorial "/ Network" Migration and Law ", Russia: Internally displaced persons from Chechnya June 2002 - May 2003, May 2003

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, response to the Bavarian Court of Justice regarding the situation of Chechen internally displaced persons in the Russian Federation, especially in Ingushetia, October 29, 2003 Federal Office for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees, Russian Federation - Information - Chechnya, November 2003

Ad hoc report by the (German) Foreign Office on the situation in the Russian Federation (Chechnya) relevant to asylum and deportation from February 16, 2004, as of January 31, 2004 Society for Threatened Peoples, statement on the situation of Chechen refugees on the territory of the Russian Federation (written by Sarah Reinke), October 2002, updated February 2004, published in March 2004 Society for Threatened Peoples, Chechnya, Spring 2004 (written by Sarah Reinke), published in March 2004, Amnesty International Germany, query response to the BayrVGH, April 16, 2004

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Basis of Claims and Background Information on Asylum-seekers and Refugees from the Russian Federation, May 2004 Swiss Refugee Aid, Chechnya and the Chechen population in the Russian Federation (written by Klaus Ammann). May 24, 2004

Swiss refugee aid, Chechen asylum seekers. Position of the Swiss Refugee Aid SFH, June 8, 2004

Federal Office for Refugees, Focus: Russia. Domestic escape alternative for Chechens, Bern, August 11, 2004 Quiring, Manfred, Alkhanov rules out talks with Chechen rebels. In: Die Welt from August 31, 2004 (; August 31, 2004)

Society for Threatened Peoples, Chechnya in the late summer of 2004: No prospect of peace. A memorandum of the Society for Threatened Peoples (written by Sarah Reinke), published September 2004

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR statement on asylum seekers and refugees from the Chechen Republic (Russian Federation), October 22, 2004 Ad-hoc report by the (German) Foreign Office on the situation in the Russian Federation (Chechnya that is relevant to asylum and deportation ) dated December 13, 2004

Chechnya Weekly, Maskhadov Killed. Volume VI, Issue 10, 9 March 2005

( 09 && issue_id = 3256)

PACE Voices No Objections to Russian Policy in Chechnya (, March 22, 2005)

2. The independent Federal Asylum Senate has considered:

2.1. The decision is based on the following findings:

2.1.1. On the situation in Chechnya and the situation of the Chechens in the Russian Federation: On the general political development in Chechnya:

According to Article 5, Paragraph 2 of its constitution (from 1993), the Russian Federation consists of republics, regions, areas, federal cities, an autonomous region and autonomous districts as equal subjects of the Russian Federation. According to Article 65, Paragraph 1 of this constitution, these republics include the Chechen Republic - located in the North Caucasus - as well as its neighboring republics Dagestan, Ingushetia and North Ossetia (since 1996 "Republic of North Ossetia and Alania").

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Chechnya declared itself independent in 1991; This led to the First Chechen War in 1994, which ended with de facto independence in 1996. After that, violent power struggles raged in Chechnya, crime was high and spread across the borders, and gangs from Chechnya attacked neighboring republics. The Second Chechnya War began towards the end of 1999 when - after bombings in various Russian cities - Russian troops invaded Chechnya again. By the spring of 2000, the Russian ("federal") forces had dominated almost the entire territory and all major cities. The Chechen resistance fighters evaded into impassable forest and mountain areas of the republic, and a guerrilla war began. The federal security forces are trying to eliminate and destroy the rebels as part of their so-called "anti-terrorist operation", but have repeatedly suffered heavy blows. These clashes also claim many casualties among the Chechen civilian population. Overall, the rebels are less and less capable to carry out larger operations, on the other hand, targeted liquidations, bomb attacks and suicide attacks are becoming more frequent.

Since a hostage-taking in Moscow ("North-East") in October 2002, the Russian government has been pushing the "political process", as it is called, "Chechenization", which includes a constitutional referendum, Chechen presidential elections and elections to a Chechen parliament These steps will (should) be carried out through an amnesty designed to make it easier for resistance fighters to return to civilian life, increased efforts to rebuild, compensation payments for families whose housing and property have been destroyed during the conflict, autonomy regulations for Chechnya and the gradual transfer of responsibility The Russian leadership is sticking to this official "road map." Negotiations with the rebels - including the government of President Aslan Maskhadov, who was elected in 1997 - were unconditionally rejected imated (pro-Russian) Chechen authorities and rulers. The amnesty was decided in June 2003, but it was unclear and ended in failure.

In March 2003, the new Chechen constitution and electoral laws for the presidential and parliamentary elections in Chechnya were approved in a referendum. According to official information, almost 90% of those eligible to vote took part; almost 96% agreed. This information aroused considerable doubts among critical observers. The new constitution stipulates that Chechnya is part of the Russian Federation (Article 1, Paragraph 2); the envisaged autonomy regulations are strictly limited.

Akhmed Kadyrov was elected as Chechen President on October 5, 2003, the Chechen administration chief appointed by Moscow in June 2000, a former resistance fighter (according to the official results, he received 80.84% ​​of the votes; the turnout was 87.7% with around 560,000 registered voters, including around 30,000 Russian security forces permanently stationed in Chechnya). All serious opponents had previously been eliminated. Although Kadyrov had little support from the Chechen population, he was able to rely on "administrative resources" (including his own bodyguard), on a powerful clan and on protection from Moscow. Contrary to official statements, journalists and human rights activists reported that the polling stations were mostly empty and that the voting process was irregular. Kadyrov refused to talk to Maskhadov, who condemned the election and announced that he would continue the armed struggle. Nevertheless, he also repeatedly expressed himself critical of the central government's approach. On 9 May 2004 he was assassinated. On August 29, 2004, Alu Alkhanov was elected as his successor, the previous interior minister of Chechnya; he also ruled out talks with the rebels. He received 74% of the vote with a turnout of 85%; this has been questioned by independent observers. The parliamentary elections, which were originally planned for 2004, are due to take place in October 2005.

The separatist leader Aslan Maskhadov also fell victim to an attack on March 8, 2005. On the security situation in Chechnya:

Since the beginning of May 2003, the security situation in and around Chechnya has worsened (the rebels carried out a series of bloody attacks; the security forces increased their repressive attacks). At the beginning of August 2003 there was a suicide attack on a military hospital in Mozdok (North Ossetia) with 50 fatalities, in August 2003 there was heavy fighting around the mountain village of Avtura (in the Shali district), and in mid-September 2003 there was an attack on the headquarters of the FSB (des Russian domestic secret service) in Magas in Ingushetia (four dead, over 20 injured), on December 5, 2003 to a bomb attack on a commuter train in the border area to Chechnya (45 dead, more than 150 injured), on June 22, 2004 to an attack on government facilities in the Ingush capital Nazran (90 dead). On December 15, 2003, rebels invading Dagestan killed nine border guards. The clashes have intensified since Kadyrov's killing. In early September 2004, Chechen rebels occupied a school in Beslan (North Ossetia) and took hundreds of hostages, including many children. According to official figures, the attack claimed 326 lives (the actual number is said to be higher). In Moscow, too, there are repeated attacks by Chechen assassins: in October 2002, a hostage-taking in a theater (where the musical "Nord-Ost" was played; 700 people were taken hostage; 41 and more than 100 other people), on July 5, 2003 to two suicide attacks on the sidelines of a rock festival, on December 9, 2003 to an attack in front of the Hotel "National" (6 dead).

In the run-up to the constitutional referendum in early March 2003, up to 1,270 Russian land forces were withdrawn. Nevertheless, various estimates assume that between 70,000 and 100,000 men of the "United Federal Forces" remain in the region. On September 1, 2003, the management responsibility for the "Measures to Combat Terrorism in the North Caucasian Region of the Russian Federation" was transferred as planned from the domestic secret service FSB (which it had held since January 2001) to the Russian Ministry of the Interior.

The two camps - the federal forces (and their local allies) and the Chechen rebels - are inherently not homogeneous.The pro-Russian Chechen authorities have set up their own security apparatus. Ahmed Kadyrov's son Ramzan built a militia of several thousand men. These so-called "Kadyrowzi" are said to be responsible for countless kidnappings, tortures and murders. They give overwhelmed rebels - real or supposed - the choice of defection or death. The population fears them more than the Russian security forces.

The separatist forces on the other hand are less united than ever. President Maskhadov, elected in 1997, was in conflict with Field Commander Shamil Basayev, who repeatedly assumes responsibility for suicide attacks. Various former rebel leaders have switched sides - sometimes several times - and are now fighting on the side of the pro-Russian Chechen government. The fronts are permeable and are constantly changing.

The military operation to suppress the armed resistance in Chechnya, which the Russian government calls the "fight against terrorism", attacks by Russian troops on civilians and so-called "purges" (zacistki) by the Russian and Chechen (i.e. pro-Russian) security forces, which are carried out regularly, lead to great suffering in the civilian population. Russian and international human rights organizations and groups report serious human rights violations by Russian and Chechen security forces and serious crimes by the rebels. Arbitrary arrests and shootings, kidnappings, torture, bombing of civilians, attacks and mass murders are common; the main burden is borne by the civilian population. Order No. 80, issued by the commander-in-chief of the federal armed forces Moltenskoy at the end of March 2002, aimed at stopping arbitrary violent measures during security checks, is apparently not being complied with.

"Purges" with looting, arrests, torture and killings were reported, for example, from Alkhan-Kala (June 19, 2001 to June 25, 2001), from Tsotsin-Yurt (beginning of October 2001) and from Duba-Jurt (March 27, 2004). After the hostage-taking in Moscow in October 2002, place by place was systematically surrounded and searched by armed forces as part of clean-up operations. A few days after the operation began, over 5,000 "suspects" were interned at times. There were indications of a total of 60 concurrent operations in 45 localities. After the Moscow hostage-taking in Chechnya, after repeated helicopters were shot down near military bases, houses that could possibly provide cover for launching portable anti-aircraft missiles were blown up. Chechens who lived in these houses were arrested as supporters of "terrorists" for not having actively participated in preventing attacks. According to press reports, a house in Chechnya where one of the hostage-takers lived was blown up after the hostage-taking.

Human rights organizations report numerous "disappearances" of civilians; they assume 50 to 80 people disappeared in "purges" every month. Anyone who does not die as part of a purge becomes a hostage. In recent years, a real hostage trade has been established in Chechnya from which the various warring parties benefit. Family members of suspected rebels are increasingly being taken hostage in order to force them to surrender. Ramzan Kadyrov has spoken out in favor of legal regulations that make it possible to prosecute family members of suspected rebels.

Civilians and soldiers are constantly being killed in explosions, security forces or resistance fighters allow themselves to attack or people become victims of crimes; more and more people are injured or killed by mines. Snipers are also still active. The vast majority of Chechnya residents live in dire poverty. Despite this, armed forces on all sides continue to constantly control, abuse and rob them. It is reported that soldiers clear out entire houses and then sell the stolen belongings in the markets of southern Russia.

Refugees in Chechnya are said to have been repeatedly shot at by Russian troops; looting, rape and robbery by Russian security forces are also reported. In the meantime, graves with several (according to information from non-governmental organizations up to two hundred) bodies have been found in various places in Chechnya, some of which showed signs of torture. Many civilians were and are already blocked from escape from the combat area due to the fighting. During the armed conflict, Russian authorities also temporarily prevented civilians from leaving the combat area. When crossing the border into neighboring regions, especially Ingushetia, Russian security forces are often said to extort money from refugees.

International and Russian human rights organizations report on so-called filtration camps or points. According to the Russian interpretation, they serve the purpose of tracking down terrorists among the refugees. Based on eyewitness reports, the human rights organizations initially assumed that at least one such "filtration camp" was being operated on the border between Ingushetia and Chechnya. There, shielded from the public, torture (e.g. electric shocks, beatings, etc. on the head and back with a metal hammer, rape) by Russian special forces is said to occur. In the meantime, on the basis of eyewitness reports and film recordings, it can be assumed that there are further filtration camps in and around Grozny, in which there is also systematic torture. At the end of March 2004, after the purges in the villages of Sernovodskaya and Assinovskaya, all men aged 14 and over were taken to a filtration camp that had been set up in a school. There they are said to have been tortured individually for hours and asked for the names and whereabouts of rebels. There are also reports of so-called "filtration points" that are maintained by Russian security forces and, in a similar manner, by Chechen rebels. There, for example, prisoners are supposed to be kept in holes in the ground. The Russian human rights organization Memorial also alleges that so-called "death squads", composed of members of Russian or Chechen security forces, operated in Chechnya and committed serious human rights violations.

Intellectuals and leaders in particular are put under pressure from both sides. The resistance fighters kill them because of collaboration, the security forces because they stand up for the local population.

What is relatively new is that women are also victims of purges. Torture methods include kicks, blows with hands, guns or sticks, electric shocks, burning with cigarettes or other objects, injuries with knife or bayonet, staying in holes or gassed cells. Prisoners should be spat at, urinated and whipped, they should be forcibly administered drugs and executions should be faked. Russian soldiers report that prisoners are practically always killed after being tortured for as long as possible. Women are systematically raped in detention. Since this is considered a great shame for them, many commit suicide afterwards. Even when Russian soldiers take over towns, rape occurs, for example in December 1999 in Alkhan-Yurt, southwest of Grozny. There are also alleged executions (41 victims) among the civilian population. Amnesty also continues to report rape and extrajudicial killings of civilians during military operations.

Russian and international non-governmental organizations report serious crimes committed by Chechen resistance fighters. They, too, regularly carry out "cleanups" in search of collaborators. They are supposed to take civilians hostage and execute them, torture and murder Russian soldiers and cooperative Chechens, kidnap and rape women, commit looting and consciously wage war in and out of civil facilities and buildings. Chechen rebels, for example, have forced access to villages, making them targets of Russian bombing attacks. Many civilians are killed in bomb attacks by the rebels. The resistance fighters use child soldiers in combat, but also to place land mines. The rebels are trying to disrupt the "Chechenization" of the administration by creating recruitment problems for the administration and the Chechen militia, and are also deliberately liquidating people. They kill civilians who do not support them, use them as human shields, force them to build positions or prevent them from fleeing Chechnya. Repeatedly, elderly Russians unable to leave Chechnya have been killed for no apparent reason. (Most Russians or members of other non-Chechen ethnic groups left Chechnya during the First Chechen War.)

In the areas of Chechnya that are controlled by Russian troops (i.e. the entire territory of the republic except in mountainous regions that are difficult to access), the security of the civilian population is due to constant raids, guerrilla activities, hostage-taking, "clean-up operations", looting and attacks (above all. by Russian soldiers).

In principle, every resident of the republic - regardless of social status, place of residence and age - can become a victim of human rights violations. In its report of September 20, 2004, the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe describes the human rights situation in the Chechen Republic as "catastrophic". On the supply situation in Chechnya:

The economic situation is very bad (unemployment is around 80%) and the infrastructure is largely destroyed. The population cannot be adequately supplied with food. Even international aid organizations can only introduce them to a very limited extent and selectively, as the country is difficult to access for such deliveries due to the security situation, bureaucratic obstacles and the corruption of the local administration and the security forces. Infrastructure (electricity, heating, etc.) and the health system have almost completely collapsed. For example, entire villages and tent camps fell ill with measles in 2003. As a result of the destruction and fighting - especially in the capital Grozny - medical facilities in Chechnya are largely no longer functional. Reconstruction is slow. Medical care for injured people is only possible to a very limited extent. 84% of the children in Chechnya have health problems; many no longer go to school, and the quality of teaching is also declining due to the shortage of teachers. In the meantime - according to the all-Russian census of 2002 - only 82.9% of Chechens speak the Russian language, which is very important for advancement in the Federation; no other ethnic group with more than 0.01% of the population has a lower proportion of Russian speakers. Many children and young people had to drop out of their education because of the war and are now growing up in an environment that only speaks Chechen.

A third of the cultivable land has been completely destroyed, around 80% of the livestock has been lost. The transport and therefore also the food costs have risen sharply because of the countless roadblocks at which rights of way have to be paid. To ensure their survival, many people sell their last belongings. The Russian government has repeatedly promised money for reconstruction, but so far the population has felt little of it. Much of the money seeps away in Moscow or in the Chechen administration. A big problem in Chechnya is - as the (German) Foreign Office puts it - ubiquitous corruption; this is also conceded by the Russian government. On the situation of Chechen refugees in Ingushetia:

The fighting, the attacks on civilians and the emergency have forced many Chechen residents to seek refuge in the neighboring republics of Ingushetia and Dagestan, in other regions of Russia and in nearby countries. (Thousands of people live in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.) The humanitarian situation in the refugee camps in neighboring regions is better than in Chechnya as a result of international aid. The living conditions for the refugees in the emergency shelters in Ingushetia are still difficult. Ingushetia and the Russian disaster control ministry can only guarantee a minimum of humanitarian aid and are overwhelmed with caring for the refugees. Under the direction of the United Nations Coordination Office (OCHA), numerous international and non-governmental organizations have been providing extensive humanitarian aid in the region for years. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, around 150,000 Chechens were in Ingushetia until the beginning of "voluntary return" in the summer of 2002, a third of them in tent camps and two thirds with host families and in improvised accommodation. The Chechen administration and the Russian government are keen that the refugees return to Chechnya soon. It is not known whether refugees will be forcibly returned from the camps. Compensation payments and the provision of accommodation are advertised, however, and indirect pressure is exerted to persuade the refugees to return (through administrative harassment, through increased activities of the security forces in Ingushetia and the worsening security situation). Cases have also become known that the electricity and water supplies are turned off, that food deliveries are suspended and that government support or registration are denied. The Russian non-governmental organization Memorial reports of night arrests by masked strangers.

Displaced persons were threatened that those who return to Chechnya too late will no longer receive state aid or that those who do not leave the camps will be regarded as resistance fighters. Since the beginning of summer 2003, non-governmental organizations (Memorial, Human Rights Watch) have been observing an increasing number of "clean-ups" in Ingushetia, which is therefore less and less viewed by refugees as a safe haven. Despite Russian efforts to return the refugees from neighboring regions to Chechnya, the number there is still high.

The warehouses were closed from autumn 2003, the last on June 10, 2004. Fears of the threats to personal security continue to discourage the majority of refugees from returning to Chechnya. Temporary dwellings were built there, which are said to be better equipped than the camps in Ingushetia. But they are too small to take in all of the refugees who remained in the camps. The returnees live in chaotic conditions. The OSCE Support Group reported on the poor sanitary conditions and poor living conditions (lack of medicines and food, unsatisfactory security situation) in the transitional accommodation in Grozny that it had visited. Aid organizations sometimes point to major differences between the individual temporary accommodations. For security reasons, the work of international aid organizations in Chechnya is only possible to a very limited extent. At the same time, the Russian authorities are gradually cutting back supplies for internally displaced people in Ingushetia.

Chechen refugees also have great difficulties in registering in Ingushetia (cf. Pt. On the situation of the Chechens in the Russian Federation outside Chechnya and Ingushetia:

Practically all major Russian cities have a Chechen diaspora, which has grown due to the influx of refugees (100,000 in Moscow, 50,000 in the Volga region).

The frequent terrorist attacks lead to intensive search activities by Russian security forces, which leads to discrimination against Chechens (as well as against other people of Caucasian origin or with a southern / Caucasian appearance). Due to the anti-Caucasian mood, they are increasingly exposed to arbitrary government and are under a kind of general suspicion, so that there can be control measures of all kinds (ID checks, apartment searches, fingerprints), especially in Moscow and other large cities. The Russian Interior Ministry reported in late 2002 that threats against Chechens were increasing, especially in places where they live concentrated. For the most part, the population regards them with suspicion. Various public services are not provided to Chechens simply because of their origin.

Chechens, like all Russian citizens, are anchored in the constitution (Art.27 para. 1), the right to freedom of movement and the free choice of residence and place of residence. In practice, however, administrative regulations in many places (including in large cities such as Moscow and St. Petersburg) make it difficult for people from the southern republics to move here legally.

The 1993 Federal Law provides for a system of current residence ("temporary registration") or residence ("permanent registration") registration, whereby citizens report their place of residence and residence to the local Ministry of Interior. The previous "Propiska" system not only provided for notification by the citizen, but also for permission or denial by the authorities. Despite the system change, many regional authorities are applying restrictive local regulations or administrative practices. In its October 2000 Special Report, the Ombudsman of the Russian Federation criticized regional regulations that conflict with national regulations and illegal enforcement practices. Registration legalizes residence and registration at the place of residence. This is a prerequisite for access to social assistance, state-subsidized housing or the free health system. Those who are not registered do not get legal work.

In fact, Chechens from Chechnya cannot register permanently anywhere in the Russian Federation if they do not have special connections or appropriate financial resources. While it is possible for them to stay illegally in Russian cities, there is a constant risk of being picked up by the police, mistreated and charged with a constructed crime.

Russian law provides for the status of a forced resettler. Between 1991 and 1996 150,000 Chechen people (mostly ethnic Russians) were granted this status; however, it has practically not been awarded to Chechens for a number of years. From October 1999 to December 2001, 12,464 people were recognized as forced resettlers in the Russian Federation, but almost exclusively people of other than Chechen nationality. The Russian authorities argue that there is no "massive disturbance of public order" in Chechnya - one of the reasons for recognition. This status is often the only way to get minor humanitarian aid. Forced resettlers also find it much easier to register again. As Chechens are not granted status, they do not benefit from the aforementioned advantages.

Valid documents are vital for Chechens anywhere in the Russian Federation. Documents are constantly being checked in the cities. Chechens and other members of Caucasian ethnicities are usually subjected to checks several times a day, especially on public transport. Since the regulations are constantly changing and differing locally, neither the security forces nor the holders of documents often have sufficient information.

No determinations are made on the question of whether ethnic Russians who are fleeing Chechnya also have great difficulty gaining a foothold in the Russian Federation.

2.1.2. About the applicant's person and reasons for fleeing:

The applicant is a citizen of the Russian Federation and belongs to the Chechen ethnic group. His face is badly injured; he only has one eye. The injury resulted from an explosion. Since he was around 16 or 17 years old, he has been suspected of being a resistance fighter because of this injury. As a result, he was repeatedly arrested, beaten and mistreated by Russian forces (and in some cases by their Chechen allies). This happened, among other things, when he wanted to attend an English course in G. and drove daily from his village G. to G. and back. He broke off this course after a short time. When he was already in Ingushetia on the run, his mother in G. was asked about him; she was threatened that he would disappear.

2.2. These findings are based on the following assessment of evidence: The findings on the situation in Chechnya and the situation of the Chechens in the Russian Federation are based mainly on to the following country reports mentioned above (Pt. 1.4):

the two ad hoc reports of the (German) Foreign Office on the situation in the Russian Federation (Chechnya) relevant to asylum and deportation of February 16, 2004 (as of January 31, 2004) and of December 13, 2004, the report of the Swiss Refugee Aid "Chechnya and the Chechen population in the Russian Federation ", written by Klaus Ammann (hereinafter referred to as Ammann) and the report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees" UNHCR Paper on Asylum Seekers from the Russian Federation in the context of the situation in Chechnya ".

In detail, the findings are based on the following sources:

The findings on the content of constitutional provisions are based on the texts of the Constitution of the Russian Federation of December 12, 1993 ( and the Constitution of the Chechen Republic of 2003 (http : //

The statements on the "Kadyrovzi", the structure of the separatist forces, the purge in Duba-Yurt, the hostage trade, the purges in Sernovodskaya and Assinovskaya, the purges by Chechen rebels, the murder of elderly Russians, the 2003 measles epidemic, on the situation in the schools and on the knowledge of Russian among Chechens, as well as on the closure of the camps in Ingushetia from autumn 2003, rely on Ammann, who also summarizes the view that basically every inhabitant of Chechnya could become a victim of human rights violations. The findings on the security situation, in particular on the purges, are also based on the memorandum "Chechnya in the late summer of 2004:

No prospect of peace "of the Society for Threatened Peoples. The finding that most non-Chechens left the country during the First Chechen War is based on Ammann and on the two reports of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees" UNHCR Paper on Asylum Seekers from the Russian Federation in the context of the situation in Chechnya "and" Basis of Claims and Background Information on Asylum-seekers and Refugees from the Russian Federation ". The finding on child soldiers is based on the last-mentioned report of the High Commissioner.

The findings on the election of Alkhanov are based on the report of the (German) Foreign Office of December 13, 2004, on the Quiring article and on the memorandum "Chechnya in late summer 2004: No prospect of peace" by the Society for Threatened Peoples. The determination of the date for the parliamentary election is based on the article "PACE Voices No Objections to Russian Policy in Chechnya". The statement about the death of Aslan Maskhadov is based on the article "Maskhadov Killed".

The other findings are based on the two reports of the (German) Foreign Office, which are supported by other reports. The details of the security situation, the persecution of intellectuals and those in charge, the methods of torture, the economic situation and the conditions in the camps in Ingushetia and their closure are also based on Ammann's report. The findings on the murders perpetrated by Chechen rebels on Chechens willing to cooperate and on ethnic Russians are also based on the "UNHCR Paper on Asylum Seekers from the Russian Federation in the context of the situation in Chechnya". The findings on the general development in Chechnya are also based on the report of the (German) Federal Office for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees "Russian Federation - Information - Chechnya" from November 2003.

The findings on the situation of Chechen refugees in Ingushetia and in other parts of the Russian Federation are also based on the report "Russia:

Internally displaced persons from Chechnya "of the human rights center" Memorial "and the network" Migration and Law ", on the" Statement on the situation of Chechen refugees on the territory of the Russian Federation "of the Society for Threatened Peoples, written by Sarah Reinke (hereinafter: Reinke) , to the two memoranda "Chechnya spring 2004" and "Chechnya in late summer 2004: No prospect of peace" of the Society for Threatened Peoples, both also written by Sarah Reinke, and to the response from Amnesty International to the Bavarian Administrative Court of April 16, 2004 The findings on registration in Ingushetia are based on the "UNHCR Paper on Asylum Seekers from the Russian Federation in the context of the situation in Chechnya" and on the response of the High Commissioner to the Bavarian Administrative Court of October 29, 2003.

The findings on the situation of the Chechens in the Russian Federation outside Chechnya and Ingushetia are largely based on the reports of the Federal Foreign Office, which are supported by other country reports. The finding that various public services are not being provided to Chechens is based on the Ammanns report. The findings on the registration system are based on the reports of the Foreign Office and on the "UNHCR Paper on Asylum Seekers from the Russian Federation in the context of the situation in Chechnya".

The finding that registration is a prerequisite for access to social assistance, subsidized housing and the health system is based on the two reports from the Foreign Office (also Ammann on health and accident insurance); it is illustrated by the Reinkes report, according to which an unregistered person cannot benefit from free medical care. She writes: "Free medical care in Moscow is granted to those who have been registered in the city for more than six months. The Moscow police only issue registrations for six months. The Moscow City Court ruled that it was illegal to provide medical care to be linked to the registry, but this judgment is ignored in reality. " The finding that it is not possible to get work legally without registration is based on the reports of Ammann and Reinke.

The finding that Chechens cannot permanently register outside of Chechnya is based on the following considerations:

The country reports describe the situation differently. So it says in the two reports of the Foreign Office:

"Due to the restrictive practice of issuing residence permits, Chechens have considerable difficulties in obtaining official registration outside of Chechnya. ... Numerous non-governmental organizations report that Chechens, especially in Moscow, are often denied registration.


Chechens live outside of Chechnya and Ingushetia, besides Moscow, mainly in southern Russia. ... Registration is generally easier there than in Moscow, among other things because the living space (as owner or tenant), which is a prerequisite for registration, is financially considerably cheaper there than in Moscow, where prices on the free housing market are extremely high. Nevertheless, registration in other parts of the country was sometimes only possible after the intervention of Memorial, Duma deputies or other influential personalities or the payment of bribes. The question of whether Chechens repatriated from Germany could legally settle in the Russian Federation was answered by Memorial in the affirmative - despite all the difficulties that existed. "

The last - essential - sentence is missing in the more recent of the two reports (while the penultimate sentence has been changed slightly). In return, the more recent report now states:

"Unregistered Chechens can only go underground in the Chechen diaspora within Russia and survive there. What their living conditions are like depends in particular on whether they have money, family connections, an education and knowledge of the Russian language."

In the report "Russia: Internally displaced persons from Chechnya" by the human rights center "Memorial" and the network "Migration and Law", however, it is said that in Moscow "people who arrived from Chechnya either have no official registration certificate at all or a "only limited to 10 days" received. Like the previous campaigns, the anti-Chechen campaign in 2002 was intended to deprive the Chechens of their livelihoods. It is directed against their freedom of movement, against the right to housing, to work, to school attendance for their children and to social protection. All of these things would not be available to people without registration.

Reinke describes the situation as follows:

"The most difficult of all is registration in Moscow. There is a practice here that aims to make it practically impossible for Chechen refugees to register. From Moscow it is known that only trying to identify as Chechen or as Registering Chechnya in Moscow is accompanied by insults and humiliations, and it is not uncommon for arbitrary arrests and regular questioning about the loyalty of those willing to register to the Moscow government.

Similar information is available from the regions of the Russian Federation. "

The Ammanns report states, among other things:

"In practice, the authorities throughout the Russian Federation determine the modalities of implementing the right to freedom of movement and the choice of residence or place of residence themselves. In fact, the Propiska system lives on. This illegal practice has already been repeated several times by the Constitutional Court and the Human rights commissioner of the Russian Federation denounced - without consequences. Despite different modalities and justifications, UNHCR and Migration and Law report unanimously of registration weights from all regions of the Russian Federation. In fact, most Chechens live in Russia as tourists who re-register every one or three months Even the attempt to register is often accompanied by insults and humiliations. It is not uncommon for arbitrary arrests to take place during the proceedings. "

Swiss Refugee Aid repeats these conclusions in its statement "Chechen Asylum Seekers. Position of Swiss Refugee Aid SFH" of 8 June 2004. You are the (Swiss) Federal Office for Refugees in its statement "Russia.

Domestic escape alternative for Chechens "of August 11, 2004 opposed: In reality, free domicile is not guaranteed everywhere. Against bribery, it is possible to obtain temporary registration without a permanent address. The price ($ 500) is very high. In individual cases Temporary registration can be enforced in cases with the support of local non-governmental organizations and counseling centers. Registration is easier to obtain outside of the major metropolitan areas and in areas with few migrants. This applies to the Leningrad region and the cities of Novgorod, Samara and Volgograd. Ultimately The Federal Office also admits that it is primarily the network of contacts and the financial resources that determine whether or not to exist in everyday Russian life.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees comes to the conclusion in the "UNHCR Paper on Asylum Seekers from the Russian Federation in the context of the situation in Chechnya" that Chechens have no opportunity to be in the Kabardino-Balkar or the Karachay-Cherkess republic or to settle in the Stavropol and Krasnoyarsk regions, and continues (IDPs = Internally Displaced Persons): "[79.]

In other administrative districts of the Russian Federation, the combination of local restrictive regulations on freedom of movement and freedom of choice of place of sojourn / residence, anti-Chechen feelings among the public, and concerns among local authorities to contain ethnic tensions and to prevent terrorist acts, deprives Chechen IDPs of a genuine internal relocation alternative. … [84.] Where individuals in need of and deserving international protection are unable to obtain the protection of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, it is recommended that they be given access to complementary forms of protection, at least on a temporary Base. … [85.] While Ingushetia has been liberally admitting IDPs from Chechnya and accepts their continuing presence in the Republic, the situation of Chechen IDPs there became precarious after the adoption of the May 2002 Action Plan for return and following the October 2002 hostage crisis in Moscow. IDPs in Ingushetia risk pressure to return to Chechnya according to federal policy. Proximity to the conflict area as well as the continuation of military activities in Chechnya has also exacerbated this situation. For these reasons, UNHCR would strongly advise against considering Ingushetia as a reasonable relocation alternative for ethnic Chechen asylumseekers originating from Chechnya. "

The High Commissioner referred to this report in his query response to the Bavarian Administrative Court of October 29, 2003 and in his report "Basis of Claims and Background Information on Asylum-seekers and Refugees from the Russian Federation" of May 2004. He stayed with the conclusions the "UNHCR Statement on Asylum Seekers and Refugees from the Chechen Republic (Russian Federation)" of October 22, 2004, in which he again referred to his statement of February 2003 and, among other things. carried out:

"In view of this situation and in the absence of a real domestic escape alternative within the Russian Federation for Chechens, UNHCR continues to believe that Chechens who were permanently resident in Chechnya before applying for asylum abroad should be viewed as in need of international protection they either:

a) have a well-founded fear of persecution and thus meet the criteria of the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, and / or

b) Left Chechnya because of a serious and ubiquitous threat to their life, personal security or freedom as a result of general violence or serious disruption of public security and order. "

The High Commissioner does not address the question of registration in this statement, but assumes that ethnic Chechens from Chechnya have no "real domestic escape alternative". However, he can only come to this legal conclusion because he assumes - as the connection with the older report shows - that the named persons would not be able to settle in the Russian Federation (outside of Chechnya).

Amnesty International stated in a query response to the Bavarian Administrative Court on April 16, 2004:

"Given the knowledge of the practiced

Immigration restrictions for Chechen nationals in

the areas mentioned and given the degree of those mentioned

Amnesty International is avoiding repression and assaults

from that there are Chechens throughout Russia

Can't stop the Federation safely and permanently. ... we

would like ... to point out that after

Amnesty International's opinion ultimately remains open as to whether there are known cases of forced repatriation to Chechnya or Ingushetia. The situation in the other parts of the Russian Federation is so grave for Chechen people, regardless of any repatriation measures, that one cannot speak of effective and permanent protection against persecution there either. "

The appeals authority agrees that Chechens from Chechnya are being denied registration in the Russian Federation as a whole. This view is shared by Ammann, but also - in several statements - by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, by Amnesty International and, as a tendency, also by Reinke; basically only the older of the two reports by the Federal Foreign Office and the statement are against them of the Swiss Federal Office. (The more recent report by the Foreign Office speaks of the fact that Chechens "at best" could "go underground" in the Chechen diaspora in Russia.) The Foreign Office report does not contain a detailed account. If one considers that the German Foreign Office is generally exercising greater restraint, it seems justified to weight its position less than that of the other offices. In any case, the High Commissioner cannot be accused of propagating a one-sided view of things (cf. for the indicative effect of such recommendations VwGH November 13, 2001, 2000/01/0453; August 16, 2003, 2003/01/0021). In the end, the Swiss Federal Office also comes to the conclusion; it is primarily the network of contacts and the financial resources that decide.

With regard to the present case, it should also be noted in its reports that the Foreign Office assumes that the Russian authorities pay special attention to those who have been deported (returned) "Chechnya," particularly those who have or are involved in the Chechnya question Assume that the Russian authorities are involved in this. "

The statements about the status of a forced resettler are based on Reinke and on the "UNHCR Paper on Asylum Seekers from the Russian Federation in the context of the situation in Chechnya", the representations of which are supported by those of the Foreign Office and Ammann.

The finding that staying illegally in Russian cities is possible, but dangerous, is based on the report by the (Swiss) Federal Office for Refugees and on Ammann, who further explains that there is also a risk of deportation to Chechnya. This was not determined because, for example, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees did not assume it was in his response to the Bavarian Administrative Court on October 29, 2003.

The fact that no determinations have been made as to whether Russians who are fleeing Chechnya also have difficulties gaining a foothold in the Russian Federation is based on the following consideration: Ammann writes: "At this point it must also be mentioned that most Russians and Members of other non-Chechen ethnic groups left Chechnya during the first Chechen war and have now settled elsewhere in the Russian Federation. In the temporary refugee shelter in Tver ', however, there are around 20 Russians who fled Chechnya as well as Chechen families 'Chechens' were unable to find a livelihood in the rest of Russia either. " While this statement suggests on the one hand that Russians may face similar problems as ethnic Chechens, on the other hand it seems to be just an exceptional phenomenon because there are hardly any Russians who are fleeing Chechnya. The "UNHCR Paper on Asylum Seekers from the Russian Federation in the context of the situation in Chechnya" also assumes that most of the non-Chechens who fled Chechnya during the First Chechnya War did not return there. According to this report, ethnic Russians who have fled Chechnya are said to have had difficulties registering, but these difficulties cannot be compared with those Chechens face. Furthermore, in his report "Basis of Claims and Background Information on Asylum-seekers and Refugees from the Russian Federation" from May 2004, the High Commissioner points out that "[I] n Chechnya, the struggle for independence from the Russian Federation and the subsequent armed conflicts led to the departure of over 400,000 Russian speakers (ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, Armenians, Jews, Germans, etc.) from Chechnya, leaving behind mostly ethnic Chechens and Ingush. " Finally, in the "UNHCR Statement on Asylum Seekers and Refugees from the Chechen Republic (Russian Federation)", the High Commissioner basically maintains that "asylum seekers and refugees from Chechnya are predominantly Chechens", and he also assumes that "ethnic Russians if necessary have an internal escape alternative within the Russian Federation, provided that it is not impossible for them to register at another place of residence ". As a result, he leaves the question of the fate of ethnic Russians open.

Since it is unlikely that ethnic Russians have fled Chechnya in recent years and their situation is unclear, no statements are made about their fate. In this context, it should be noted that according to the report "Russia: Internally displaced persons from Chechnya" by the Human Rights Center "Memorial" and the "Migration and Law" network, a Russian ensign was convicted for raping a woman whose name is Russian was. It is forbidden to draw generalized conclusions from this about the handling of the soldiers with civilians of Russian origin, because the documents do not contain any further reports in this direction (it would be conceivable, for example, that the Russian woman was married to an ethnic Chechen) . These findings differ from those made by the Federal Asylum Office in the contested decision (see above Pt. 1.2.1), above all. in that the possibility of Chechens to settle outside Chechnya in the Russian Federation is judged differently. To this end, the contested decision relies on the decisions of the OVG Lüneburg of November 27, 2002, 13 LA 321/02 and 13 LA 326/02, as well as of July 9, 2003, 13 LA 118/03, on the judgment of the Schleswig-Holstein OVG ( OVG Schleswig) of April 24, 2003, 1 LB 213/01, and on the assessment of the Russian human rights organization Memorial, as it was reproduced in the report of the Foreign Office of February 16, 2004. Insofar as the decision also specifies the number of Chechens who are said to live in different areas of the Russian Federation, it is sufficient to point out that this does not prove the possibility of Chechens from Chechnya currently gaining a foothold in the Russian Federation. For example, the statement of the (Swiss) Federal Office for Refugees "Focus: Russia. Domestic Flight Alternative for Chechens" of August 11, 2004 expressly points out the difference between Chechens who have lived in the diaspora for a long time and those who were defeated by the war ( since) in 1999.

The assessment of "Memorial" - or rather its reproduction in the report of the Foreign Office of February 16, 2004 - has already been discussed above.

At the request of the Federal Asylum Office - in a procedure that concerned another Chechen asylum seeker (number: 252.318-X / 47/04) - the Federal Asylum Office sent extracts from the first two of the above-mentioned resolutions of the OVG Lüneburg, with the remark that only these extracts are available to the Federal Asylum Office. In these resolutions, the Lower Saxony OVG - as far as can be inferred from these excerpts - relies on its own case law on the "domestic escape alternative in the Russian Federation" without giving any further reasons. Also in its resolution 9.7.2003, 13 LA 118/03, This court remains with its case law. Control measures against Chechens do not have any asylum-relevant weight; they are also not under the mere pretext of combating terrorism. Further attacks can only be identified in individual cases as so-called administrative excesses that are irrelevant under asylum law.

In its judgment on April 24, 2003, 1 LB 213/01, 4 A 253/00, the Schleswig-Holstein OVG also ruled that Chechens had an option to flee within the Russian Federation. The reprisals and hostility had not reached a level on the basis of which every Chechen would have to fear of being politically persecuted nationwide on the basis of his ethnicity. The intensity of the known cases is "in no way comparable with the massive and targeted attacks on the life and limb of the civilian population in Chechnya during the first Chechnya war." That Chechens legally living in the Russian Federation can stay at their place of residence speaks It is irrelevant that these Chechens were born outside Chechnya or that they were displaced as a result of the First Chechnya War or that they have settled in their new place of residence with registration for other reasons. The registration is not handled uniformly across the country In terms of the means of knowledge, "with regard to the handling of the necessity of registration [...] there is still no uniform picture. As before, especially in the larger cities of the Russian Federation, it seems to be impossible to legally find an apartment and job without permission to stay. " The intensity of the hostility and discrimination "was still far behind the massive and targeted attacks on the life and limb of Chechen civilians that took place in Chechnya itself." As for the recent migration obstacles, reliable information is only available for Moscow and other large cities in the Russian Federation. There are no other secured information about a restrictive application of the registration. The neighboring regions of Chechnya, above all Ingushetia, are also coming into domestic flight alternatives Consideration.

In essence, the argumentation of the Schleswig-Holstein OVG boils down to the fact that the situation for Chechens in the Russian Federation outside Chechnya is much better than in Chechnya and that the reporting situation does not show that Chechens cannot settle anywhere in the Russian Federation. From the fact that the intensity of discrimination and hostility outside Chechnya does not reach that in Chechnya, the conclusion cannot be drawn that it is not relevant to asylum or that Chechens outside Chechnya can settle. The reports that the appellate authority has viewed and some of which are younger than the judgment of the OVG Schleswig do not in some cases exclude the possibility of such settlement opportunities; ultimately, however, they cannot be identified. In view of this, the appellate authority finally does not come to any other conclusion than that stated above.

2.2.2. The findings on the person of the applicant are based on his credible information. The fact that the applicant is Chechen from Chechnya is also borne out by the statement made by the interpreter - a native Chechen who grew up in Chechnya and lived there for years - that the applicant speaks Chechen like a Chechen from Chechnya. Incidentally, the Federal Asylum Office had already assumed - after it had carried out a language test - that the applicant was Chechen.

His remarks in the appeal hearing on the arrests are coherent and understandable against the background of the findings on the situation in Chechnya, in particular on the "purge operations" by the federal armed forces. It is easily conceivable that Chechens are "taken away" by federal forces for no particular reason, that is, arrested and stopped, and that ** the appellant was targeted because of his severe facial injury.

The Federal Asylum Office justifies its assessment of evidence initially with general comments on the "basic requirements" for a credible statement. It then rightly admits (see VwGH 11/28/1995, 95/20/0094; 04/04/2004, 2001/20/0338; 05/25/2004, 2003/01/0299) that the statements on the escape route are not relevant to asylum, believes, however, that they could be "an indication of the overall credibility rating". It is a "notorious fact" that travelers - "in the case of refugees, there is also the element of suspicion, i.e. special observation of the environment" - made perceptions about their travel movement. Since the applicant cannot describe his journey in detail, it can be assumed that he intentionally wants to conceal his route. The appeals authority cannot understand why travelers and especially refugees should make such perceptions. Furthermore, she cannot understand why the Federal Asylum Office evaluated the appellant's persecution allegation "only as an assertion made in the room" and why the allegation should not be sufficiently substantiated. In this context, the Federal Asylum Office accuses the applicant for not having been able to provide any concrete or detailed information as to when he was stopped; he was not even able to say exactly when and where this had happened the last time. The appellate authority cannot see why information that is not completely exact in terms of date and location could indicate that it is untrustworthy.

After all, the Federal Asylum Agency was "under no circumstances" able to understand why the Russian soldiers or police officers should hit the appellant first and only consider the medical confirmation of his injuries afterwards, although he allegedly always presented the confirmation at the beginning of the arrests. It is also not understandable why he was still in the access area of ​​the security authorities. Had they really wanted to "make him disappear", they would have had ample opportunity to do so with the alleged large number of stops. However, he was released without further consequences after each arrest.

Against the background of the country findings, it is plausible to assume that Russian forces commit attacks without first inquiring about the reasons for a distortion. All in all, the Federal Asylum Agency seems to assume that the Russian forces are acting in a targeted and rational manner that cannot be assumed according to the country reports.

There is no evidence that the appellant was guilty of any crime in an act of war; he also explicitly stated that.

2.3. Legally it follows from this: According to Section 23 AsylG, the AVG must be applied to procedures under the AsylG (cf. also Art. II, Paragraph 2, lit. D Z 43a EGVG). According to Section 66 (4) AVG, the appeal authority must always decide on the matter itself, provided the appeal is not rejected as inadmissible or delayed. It is entitled to substitute its opinion in the ruling and in the reasoning for that of the sub-authority and accordingly to change the contested decision in any direction.

According to Section 44 (1) AsylG as amended by AsylGNov. In 2003, proceedings on asylum applications submitted by April 30, 2004 must be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the AsylG as amended by Federal Law Gazette I 126/2002. The applicant submitted his asylum application before 1.5.2004; the appeal procedure is therefore basically to be carried out in accordance with the AsylG as amended by BG BGBl. The Federal Asylum Office, on the other hand, apparently assumed that the AsylGNov. 2003 is to be applied: On May 6, 2004 - recognizable with regard to Section 24 (3) AsylG, according to which asylum applications are considered to be submitted if they are submitted personally to the initial reception center by strangers - to continue his procedure in to find the initial reception center; and it informed the appellant at the interrogation on 7 May 2004 that his asylum procedure was admissible, apparently with regard to Section 24a (3) (1) AsylG. The ruling in the contested decision also mentions an asylum application dated May 6, 2004. This procedure was unlawful because the applicant had submitted his application on April 30, 2004 (this date was apparently recorded by the Gendarmerie border surveillance post in Hainburg an der Donau in Bad Deutsch-Altenburg) (see Section 3 (2) AsylG) and Section 44 (1) and 2 AsylG as amended by AsylGNov. In 2003, it depends on when the application was made (and not when it was submitted). However, this illegality does not mean that the results of the first-instance proceedings cannot be used. According to § 7 AsylG, the authority has to grant asylum seekers on application if it is credible that they are threatened with persecution within the meaning of Art. 1 Section AZ 2 GFK and none of the reasons for termination or exclusion mentioned in Art. 1 Section C or F of the GFK is present.

Refugee within the meaning of Art. 1 Section AZ 2 GFK (as amended by Art. 1 Paragraph 2 of the Protocol on the Legal Status of Refugees, Federal Law Gazette 78/1974) is someone who “out of well-founded fear, for reasons of race, religion, nationality, affiliation” to be persecuted towards a certain social group or political opinion, is located outside his home country and is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country in view of this fear; or who is stateless, outside his country habitual residence and is unable or unwilling in view of this fear to return to this country. "

The central aspect of the GRC refugee concept is the well-founded fear of persecution. A fear can only be well-founded if it is objectively understandable in the light of the asylum seeker's special situation and taking into account the circumstances in the persecuting state (see e.g. VwGH 22.12.1999, 99/01/0334; 21.12.2000, 2000/01 / 0131; January 25, 2001, 2001/20/0011). It does not matter whether a certain person is actually afraid in a specific situation, but whether a person gifted with reason would be afraid in this situation (for reasons of convention). Persecution is to be understood as an unjustified intrusion of considerable intensity into the personal sphere of the individual that is to be protected. There is considerable intensity when the intervention is suitable to justify the unreasonableness of claiming the protection of the home country or the return to the country of the previous stay. There is a risk of persecution if there is a significant likelihood of persecution; the remote possibility of persecution is not sufficient (VwGH December 21, 2000, 2000/01/0131; January 25, 2001, 2001/20/0011). The danger of persecution - the reference point for fear of persecution - does not refer to past events (cf. VwGH 18.4.1996, 95/20/0239; cf. also VwGH 16.2.2000, 99/01/0397), but requires a prognosis. The risk of persecution must have its cause in one of the reasons mentioned in Art. 1 Section A Z 2 GFK (VwGH 9.9.1993, 93/01/0284; 15.3.2001, 99/20/0128); it must be the reason why the asylum seeker is outside his home country or the country of his previous stay. The risk of persecution must be attributable to the country of origin or the country of the last habitual residence (VwGH 16.6.1994, 94/19/0183; 18.2.1999, 98/20/0468). However, only a current threat of persecution can be relevant; it must be available when the asylum decision is issued; This is the point in time when the prognosis has to be based on whether the asylum seeker has a significant probability to fear persecution for the reasons mentioned (cf. VwGH 9.3.1999, 98/01/0318; 19.10.2000, 98/20/0233).

If asylum seekers are safe from persecution in certain parts of the country and it is reasonable for them to take advantage of the protection of their country of origin, they do not need protection by granting asylum (see, for example, VwGH 24.3.1999, 98/01/0352 mwN ; 15.3.2001, 99/20/0036; 15.3.2001, 99/20/0134). The reasonableness calculation inherent in the concept of a "domestic flight alternative" assumes that the asylum seeker does not find himself in a hopeless situation there, especially since economic disadvantages can also be relevant to asylum if they deprive them of any livelihood (VwGH 8.9.1999, 98 / 01/0614, 29.3.2001, 2000/20/0539).

According to the constant case law of the Administrative Court (see VwGH 28.3.1995, 95/19/0041; 27.6.1995, 94/20/0836; 23.7.1999, 99/20/0208; 21.9.2000, 99/20/0373; 26.2.2002, 99/20/0509 mwN; 12.9.2002, 99/20/0505; 17.9.2003, 2001/20/0177) an act of persecution is not only to be attributed to the state if it is directly carried out by state organs (for reasons the GFK) has been set; On the contrary, this can also be the case if the state is unwilling or unable to prevent acts of persecution that do not originate from state authorities, provided that these acts - if they were carried out by state organs - would be relevant to asylum.

For the question of whether there is a sufficiently functioning state authority, it depends on whether someone who is persecuted by a third party (for the reasons stated in the GFK), despite state protection, has an asylum-relevant disadvantage from this persecution with a significant disadvantage Probability (cf. VwGH March 22, 2000, 99/01/0256 following Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law2 [1996] 73; further VwGH February 26, 2002, 99/20/0509). For a persecuted person it makes no difference whether he has to expect a disadvantage due to state persecution with the relevant probability or whether he is threatened with this disadvantage with the same probability due to persecution that originates from others and that the state does not adequately prevent can. In both cases it is not possible for him or, in view of his well-founded fear, not reasonable to avail himself of the protection of his home country (cf. VwGH 22.3.2000, 99/01/0256). The appellant managed to make persecution credible. Because of his disfigurement he came into the focus of the Russian forces and their Chechen allies and was arrested several times. He was accused of being a resistance fighter. He thus belongs to a group of people who are assumed to have a close relationship with Chechen separatists and who are therefore particularly affected by anti-separatist actions (cf. for a similar situation VwGH 16.6.1999, 98/01/0339). It is therefore highly likely that the Russian authorities would pay special attention to him if he were to be returned.

The findings on the situation in Chechnya show that the widespread attacks by federal forces against Chechens - including the purges - serve the purpose of eliminating the Chechen rebels. The establishment of the "filtration camps" in particular shows that this ties in with the political sentiments that are at least imputed to the victims. The attacks against the appellant are thus linked to one of the characteristics mentioned in the GFK. During the arrests he came into the focus of the Russian authorities and would therefore be pursued again if he returned. He is thus a victim of persecution due to characteristics relevant to asylum and lives in the well-founded fear of - in the event of his return - of being exposed to persecution for this reason.

The findings also show that it is not possible for the applicant to settle elsewhere in the Russian Federation; This is because he is viewed by the Russian forces as an opponent and therefore has to expect persecution outside of Chechnya as well. In addition, it is not possible for Chechens who have previously lived in Chechnya - apart from individual cases - to settle outside of Chechnya in the Russian Federation. A branch in Ingushetia is ruled out because in this republic - which is literally overcrowded with refugees from Chechnya - a program for the return of Chechen refugees to Chechnya is being implemented. For the rest of the Russian Federation, this impossibility also follows from the findings. There is therefore no domestic alternative to flight to the applicant.

In summary, it emerges that the appellant is staying outside the Russian Federation for well-founded fear of being persecuted because of his political views and that none of the reasons for termination or exclusion mentioned in Art. 1 Section C or F of the GRC apply.

2.3.3. According to § 12 AsylG, the decision on granting asylum was to be combined with the determination that the alien thus became a refugee by virtue of the law.

2.4. It had to be decided according to the ruling.